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This dissertation is a cross-national investigation of the relationship between 
cultural heterogeneity and regimes’ respect for basic human rights.  The quantitative 
human rights literature has not yet addressed the question of whether high levels of 
cultural diversity are beneficial or harmful. My research addresses this gap. 
I address the debate between those who argue that diversity is negatively related 
to basic human rights protection and those who argue it is likely to improve respect for 
these rights.  Ultimately, I propose that regimes in diverse countries will be less likely to 
provide an adequate level of subsistence (otherwise known as basic human needs) and 
security rights (also known as integrity of the person rights) to their citizens than regimes 
in more homogeneous countries. 
Using a data set of 106 non-OECD countries for the years 1983 and 1993, I 
employ bivariate, linear multivariate regression, and causal modeling techniques to test 
whether higher levels of ethnolinguistic and religious diversity are associated with less 
regime respect for subsistence and security rights.  The analysis reveals that higher levels 
of cultural diversity do appear to lead to lower respect for subsistence rights.  However, 
counter to the hypothesized relationship, high levels of diversity appear to be compatible 
with high levels of respect for security rights. 
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In the past several decades we have witnessed a great increase in the amount of 
research devoted to what determines the level of a government’s respect for its citizens.  
Researchers have attempted to empirically identify links between human rights and social 
phenomena including, but not limited to population size and growth, civil and 
international war, the level of economic development, constitutional statements regarding 
human rights, and colonial history.  It is the goal of my research to investigate an under-
examined social phenomenon and its relationship to government performance with regard 
to individual rights--the level of ethnic and religious diversity in a particular country.  
Diversity in its most basic sense can be thought of as the level of social heterogeneity due 
to ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages.  Although at some level there are some 
differences among the terms for societal heterogeneity that will be discussed herein, for 
discussion purposes I will refer to “cultural diversity," “fractionalization," and 
“heterogeneity” interchangeably.  In my dissertation I examine the relationship between 
the level of societal fractionalization in a country and the level of security, subsistence, 
and political rights that its citizens are afforded. 
1.1 The Research Question 
With the end of World War II came the beginning of a fundamental shift in our 
understanding of the role of the state in international relations. Spawned by an awareness 
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of the atrocities committed by the Nazis, the international community began to reject the 
long-standing idea that leaders in sovereign nation-states have the right to govern their 
citizens in any way they please, even if the means for doing so are brutal. Instead, during 
the postwar period many began to believe that individuals are endowed with certain 
rights merely because they are humans.  This idea, or movement, gained strength with the 
creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and was further bolstered by a 
series of covenants and conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the (as yet unratified by the United States) International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.1  
In the 1970s came a concerted effort by newly formed human rights organizations 
to monitor and report on the human rights practices in practically every country in the 
world.  Aided by recent developments such as the microcomputer, the Internet, and better 
reporting practices, organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
and Freedom House have worked to pressure governments into more humane treatment 
of their citizens by making the human rights records of various countries available to the 
rest of the world.  The idea behind these efforts is that governments that know that they 
are being watched by individuals, international organizations, and governments will be  
less likely to violate the rights of their citizens for fear of attracting a negative reaction  
from the international community. 
 
                                                        
1The first of these documents, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted by the 
United Nations on December 10, 1948, is available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted by the United Nations on December 16, 
1966.  It is available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm.  The International Covenant on 
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In the past two decades or so, social scientists have begun to apply their  
systematic research methods to take advantage of the improved information that has 
become available on human rights practices around the world.  Researchers have 
attempted to apply social scientific techniques to the study of human rights in order to 
gain a more thorough understanding of regime behavior.  The goals of this research are 
twofold: 1) to predict where future human rights crises may occur in the future, and 2) to 
arrive at a general explanation for why human rights abuses occur. One may hope that 
achieving these research goals will improve the human condition in some way.   
More specifically, this dissertation falls into a category of social scientific 
research devoted to understanding what causes a regime to respect or to violate the basic 
human rights of its citizens.  Researchers have created and tested theories that link 
government respect for basic human rights to a number of explanatory factors, including 
population size and growth, colonial history, regime type, economic growth and 
development, civil and international conflict, and many others.  Some of these factors 
will be discussed in the next chapter. This dissertation will test yet another one of these 
purported factors: the level of cultural diversity in a society. 
Social scientists have long been interested in the relationship between societal 
diversity and good governance.  Perhaps the best-known debate is between two British 
scholars of the nineteenth century: John Stuart Mill and Lord Acton (Mill 1958).  Mill 
argued that a common language and culture was a key to securing the free institutions 
necessary for a well-functioning polity.  A common culture is necessary to develop the  
                                                                                                                                                                     




consensus that is necessary for representative government to function in a manner that 
will secure basic rights.  Acton, to the contrary, argued that it was the existence of 
culturally different societal groups, each struggling for freedom that would serve as a 
check against despotism.  My dissertation attempts to address the key element of this 
debate: whether or not a high level of diversity is conducive or harmful to the level of 
basic human rights that regimes have for their citizens. 
 While the relationship between diversity and human rights may appear to be an 
interesting and worthwhile topic of study, until recently there were not enough data 
available to conduct research on this relationship on a global scale.  In the past few years, 
data have become available that permit measurement of the relative level of diversity in a 
large number of countries. Although as with all social indicators there are measurement 
and conceptual problems with the operationalization of an abstract concept, the 
availability of quantitative data on cultural diversity creates an opportunity for cross-
national empirical human rights research because it allows for testing new hypotheses 
that may lead to more highly developed explanations of regime human rights 
performance. 
 I do not enter this research with a strong idea of how I believe cultural diversity 
will relate to government’s respect for human rights. Rather, I believe that since it 
important to search for a greater understanding of how basic human rights may be 
respected, it is best not to assume a priori that this societal phenomenon is either a 
blessing or a curse.  Reasonably good data for this particular variable are now available, 
and, as my dissertation reveals, there is an interesting theoretical debate regarding the 
relationship between diversity and human rights.  There may be practical implications 
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that arise from a greater understanding of this relationship as well.  Is it better for the 
United States to support the creation of multiethnic regimes, as in the case of Bosnia?  Or 
the creation of ethnically homogeneous countries such as East Timor?  An investigation 
into the relationship between diversity and human rights may provide some guidance to 
the question of whether diversity is better.  Thus, for both theoretical and practical 
reasons, I believe that this effort is a necessary one. 
I will discuss in the next chapter the literature that leads into the research question 
itself, but suffice to say that there has been a great debate in the literature between those 
who believe that diversity is beneficial and those who perceive it as harmful. 
 To recap, the research question I will address in this dissertation, briefly stated, is 
“are regimes in culturally diverse societies more or less likely to respect the basic human 
rights of their citizens?” 
1.2 Organization of the Study 
This dissertation is composed of six chapters.  This chapter will introduce the 
research question and discuss the organization of the study.  In addition, it will briefly 
present some arguments for the significance of this study to empirical human rights 
research and to social science research in general. Chapter 2 is a review of the social 
science literature that is relevant to my area of research.  The chapter will begin with a 
general overview of the burgeoning literature on human rights research.  The second 
section will outline the important research that sheds light on some aspect of the nexus 
between cultural diversity and respect for human rights.   The third and final section will 
present three veins of research that may be of use in the study of the nexus between 
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cultural identity and political conflict: the ethnic conflict literature, pluralist theory, and 
the social stratification literature. 
 Chapter 3 will accomplish several purposes. First, it will outline theoretical 
arguments for why ethnic and religious diversity may be related to the level of 
subsistence and security rights that governments afford their citizens.  Ethnic and 
religious diversity are hypothesized to lower subsistence rights for two reasons.  The first 
reason is that governments in diverse societies are hypothesized to be less efficient, 
leading to a lower level of provision of the type of public goods necessary for improving 
physical quality of life.  This undersupply of public goods is due to a loss of efficiency 
because governments must respond to a large number of conflicting norms and values, 
and in many cases, languages.  The higher costs of “doing business” in a diverse society 
lead to a lower output of socially desirable goods such as schools, roads, medical care, 
and infrastructure.  Hence, subsistence rights in diverse countries are hypothesized to lag 
behind those in more homogeneous countries.  A second reason is that ruling regimes in 
diverse societies may feel pressured to meet the specific demands of many large 
subpopulations within a country.  Therefore, rather than devoting public finances toward 
productive public goods, leaders may be forced to devote resources to goods that benefit 
only one of the many groups in society. 
 Ethnic and religious diversity are hypothesized to adversely affect security rights 
in the developing world for three reasons.  The first reason is that competition for scarce 
resources is more intense while state capacity for dealing with demands for societal 
groups is weak.  One might expect that under these conditions a leader may feel more 
pressured to deal with societal demands through repression.  The second reason is that 
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societal cooperation is threatened by low levels of societal trust that one might expect to 
find in a society with a large number ethnic and linguistic cleavages in societies.  Finally, 
leaders in the developing world have inherited from the colonial period a blueprint for 
governance in which domination by a ruling group over other societal groups is the 
expected manner of maintaining order. 
Second, it will discuss the data that are available for this task, including a 
description of each variable.  Notable in this section is a discussion of the variables that 
measure ethnolinguistic and religious fractionalization.  
Finally, Chapter 3 will describe the methods that I will use to address my research 
question, and discuss the utility of both bivariate and multivariate analyses as a way to 
explore the relationship between diversity and respect for human rights. Bivariate 
analysis is a good way to explore in a straightforward fashion the relationship of interest. 
This type of analysis can be performed using simple statistical techniques and scatter 
plots. 
 It is the multivariate analysis, however, that really offers the most potential for 
evaluating the linkage between diversity and government respect for human rights. This 
type of analysis is useful because it can assess the effect of the independent variable 
(ethnic or religious diversity) on the dependent variable (basic human rights).  While 
informative, standard multivariate regression techniques do not allow for the most 
complete type of analysis possible.  In order to clarify the relationship among several 
potential explanatory variables in a predictive model with human rights as the dependent 
variable, a path analytical model will be presented.  This type of model allows a 
researcher to estimate not only the direct effects of explanatory variables on the 
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dependent variable, but for the calculation of indirect effects as well.  By understanding 
both the direct and the indirect effects of ethnic and religious diversity on the level of 
basic human rights, a researcher may obtain a more complete picture of how cultural 
diversity fits into the “human rights equation” in combination with other widely used 
explanatory variables.    
The fourth chapter is an analysis of the relationship between diversity and 
subsistence rights. Bivariate and multivariate analyses are used to explore the nature of 
the relationship between these phenomena.  Hypotheses linking diversity to lower levels 
of subsistence rights are tested, and the statistical and substantive findings of this analysis 
are discussed. 
 The fifth chapter analyzes the relationship between diversity and security rights. 
As is the case with subsistence rights above, this chapter will test whether ethnolinguistic 
and religious diversity are conducive or harmful to government respect for security 
rights, and significant findings of this analysis will be discussed. 
 The sixth chapter will summarize the important findings and how they fit in with 
the existing literature on the relationship between cultural diversity and human rights.  
Furthermore, a list of recommendations for further research will be presented. 
 
1.3   Significance of the Study 
This dissertation is significant for two main reasons.  First, it addresses a 
prominent debate in the social scientific literature.  On one side of the argument are 
scholars such as Lord Acton who argue that diverse societies are more likely to be stable, 
prosperous, orderly, and peaceful.  On the other side are those such as John Stuart Mill 
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who believe that the best polities are those that are relatively homogeneous.2  While not 
addressing the issue head on, this dissertation will hopefully provide a preliminary 
answer to one aspect of this question by ascertaining whether diverse societies are more  
likely to enjoy high levels of basic human rights than their less diverse neighbors.  While 
there are many types of rights that may be called “basic," this dissertation will focus on 
the provision of two important categories of rights.  By examining the effects of diversity 
on one aspect of regime performance, this research will hopefully provide guidance for 
further research on the relative merits of societal heterogeneity as it relates to good 
governance. 
 A second major reason why this study is significant is that it adds to the existing 
and growing set of literature that seeks to understand the causal factors behind the 
decision of governments to respect or harm the basic human rights of their citizens.  A 
series of studies have assessed the impact on respect for basic rights of such factors as 
wealth and economic growth, population size and growth, regime type, domestic and 
international conflict, colonial history, and a number of others (see, for example, 
Henderson 1994; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  Although diversity has 
appeared as an explanatory variable in a small number of studies (which will be discussed 
in the next chapter), this is the first one to examine the relationship in a comprehensive 
fashion, using multivariate and causal analysis to ascertain the relative effect of diversity 
in conjunction with other political, economic, and demographic factors that are purported 
to affect the level of respect for human rights.  In addition, this study uses two different 
measures of diversity, one that is based on ethnic and linguistic differences among 
                                                        
2 For a discussion of the debate between Mill and Acton, see Dahl 1971. 
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groups, and the other based on religious differences. While a few studies have examined 
the relationship between diversity and security rights or conflict, and a few have 
investigated links between diversity and economic development, this is the first study that 
and examines the effects of diversity on two important but distinct types of basic human 
rights—security rights and subsistence rights. 





A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Are high levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity conducive to higher human rights 
performance?  Or are countries with relatively homogeneous populations more likely to 
enjoy higher levels of democratic development and respect for basic human rights?  
Recent social scientific research has focused on identifying factors that affect the rights 
of individuals, but the role of cultural diversity has to date received little attention.  This 
chapter will first survey the current theoretical and empirical landscape of human rights 
research.  It will subsequently discuss the literature on the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and rights.  Finally, I will discuss the relevance to my research question of three 
areas of social science research that relate to group behavior in politics—the ethnic 
conflict literature, pluralism, and social stratification theory.    
2.1   The Rights Literature and Regime Performance 
 
 Fueled by the improved availability of information, data collection techniques, 
and computational power, the empirical study of human rights has already experienced 
several notable developments in its brief history.  Initially, a large percentage of human 
rights research focused on the relationship between United States military and non-
military aid and the human rights records of recipient countries (Schoultz 1980; 
Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987; Gibney and Stohl 1988; 
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McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Forsythe 1993; Blanton 
1994; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Regan 1995; Poe and Meernik 1995).   
 Soon, a large body of research arose that focused on explaining cross-national 
variations in the level of government respect for basic human rights.  Shue (1980) argues 
that there are at least three basic human rights: security, subsistence, and liberty.  The 
first group of rights to receive scrutiny from quantitative research was for the most part 
security rights, or the right to be free from torture, execution, imprisonment, or violation 
of personal integrity.  Beginning in the 1980’s, research on this category of basic rights 
has begun to progress to a much higher level of statistical and theoretical sophistication. 
 Basic human rights often have been used as dependent variables in social science 
research.  Wolpin (1986), who examines the relationship between severity of repression 
and a number of potential explanatory factors, offers an early example of research that 
treats security rights as a dependent variable. He classifies developing countries by the 
level of repressive “state violence” used by their governments (102).  Taken from a 
composite of several sources, Wolpin’s measure of security rights violations includes 
such repressive actions as torture, disappearances, executions, and penal system brutality.  
He finds that military rule, military aid, and ethnic fragmentation are positively 
associated with rights violations, while literacy and education are associated with low 
levels of violations.  His study is rather broad in that it analyzes the relationship between 
rights violations and a large number of possible factors (economic, cultural, geopolitical, 
military status) in 105 non-OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries over multiple years (1973-1980).  However, since the state 
violence variable is divided into only three categories, and because the author fails to 
 
 13
employ a multivariate analysis of the data, the study’s ability to isolate the effects of 
individual factors that lead to human rights abuses is limited.    
In a similar research effort, Park (1987) finds that civil rights, as measured by the 
Freedom House Civil Liberties Index, are positively linked to welfare expenditures, 
ethnic diversity, and urban population.  Factors that are negatively correlated with 
political rights are education expenditures, military expenditures, and percentage of 
Muslim citizens in the population.   
The work of Mitchell and McCormick (1988) is significant because it isolates the 
partial effects of several variables on the level of government repression.  They find that 
higher levels of economic development lead to lower levels of torture and erroneous 
imprisonment by governments.  Authoritarian governments, on the other hand, are more 
likely to resort to murder and execution.  While Mitchell and McCormick successfully 
apply a standards-based approach to a broad cross-section of countries, they only analyze 
data from a single year (1985).  In addition, their methodology does not simultaneously 
control for the effects of all of the specified alternative explanations for rights violations.  
With this methodology, it is not possible to identify the most salient factors that 
contribute to repression because all variables are not included in a single model. In other 
words, it is not possible to know whether a particular variable has an impact on the level 
of repression, net of other variables that are also hypothesized to have an impact. 
 Henderson (1991, 1993) provides a more sophisticated analysis of security rights 
as a dependent variable in his study of 152 countries.  Henderson's methodology for 
analyzing the relationship is a multivariate regression in which the relative effects of 
several variables can be included in a single predictive model of repression. He measures 
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personal integrity rights violations with a five-point Political Terror Scale based on 
criteria created by Gastil (1980), in which countries are assigned a rank of one to five 
according to the degree of repression present.  Controlling for the effects of population 
level and growth rate, inequality, and investment, Henderson finds that higher levels of 
democracy and economic development lead to higher levels of respect for personal 
integrity rights. In addition, Henderson reports that, holding all other factors constant, 
faster population growth rates lead to higher levels of personal integrity abuse. Although 
Henderson’s sample size represents an improvement over earlier research efforts, his 
methodology does not capture dynamic relationships in the data since it only analyzes his 
data over a single cross-section in time. 
 Poe and Tate (1994) examine the determinants of personal integrity rights in a 
study that overcomes the limited cross-sectional problem with a pooled cross-sectional 
time series (PCTS) design, which can capture relationships across both space (153 
countries) and time (1980-1987).  They assess the impact of the following variables in a 
single predictive model of personal integrity violations: economic development and 
growth; population size and growth; military government; British colonial history; leftist 
regime; and civil and international war.  Poe and Tate find that both civil and 
international wars lead to lower levels of respect for personal integrity rights by 
governments.  Another variable negatively associated with respect for human rights is 
population size.  They find mixed evidence for a positive relationship between the 
presence of a leftist regime and security rights violations.  The strongest negative 
predictor of personal integrity abuse is the presence of democracy, as measured by the 
Freedom House index.  Economic development also contributes to higher levels of 
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respect for personal integrity rights.  One notable finding of the study, derived from its 
dynamic design, is that a country’s recent history of personal integrity abuse is an 
extremely good predictor of future levels of abuse.   For the dependent variable, personal 
integrity abuse, both studies employ a five point Political Terror Scale based on Amnesty 
International and State Department reports.   
Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) expand the number of time points and countries from 
the earlier study, and achieve similar findings.  The significant differences are that in the 
later study military governments are linked to abuses of integrity rights, while a British 
colonial history and a leftist government are associated with lower levels of violations.   
A recent example of scholarship in the area of security rights is the work of 
Cingranelli and Richards (1999), who attempt to place respect for various types of 
security rights on the same scale. They find that as regimes become more repressive, they 
follow a common pattern.  Protections against disappearance and extrajudicial killing 
usually break down first, when regimes are at relatively low levels of repression.  As the 
regime becomes more repressive, regimes become more likely to violate other types of 
rights, as torture and political imprisonment become more common.  Cingranelli and 
Richards’ work may be a first step by social science in predicting not only the level of 
security rights violations in a country, but the patterns in which they may typically 
violate these rights. 
 Studies of subsistence rights, or basic human needs, began somewhat later than 
studies of integrity rights.  Moon and Dixon (1985) find that, controlling for the level of 
economic development, democratic practices and leftist ideology are positively 
associated with a country’s level of basic needs satisfaction during the time period of 
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1970-75.  Higher government expenditures, on the other hand, are negatively associated 
with respect for integrity rights.  The authors measure the provision of basic human needs 
based on what they term the Disparity Reduction Rate, which is the average annual 
change in Morris’ (1979) Physical Quality of Life Index.   
In a subsequent work, Moon (1991) includes regime variables such as military 
strength, democracy, and per capita GNP in the same model with a series of control 
variables.  He finds that the proportion of rural population, Islamic influence, 
dependency, and military spending are negatively associated with satisfaction of basic 
human needs.  On the other hand, democracy, socialist influence, wealth, and Buddhist 
influence are positively correlated with physical quality of life. 
Do tradeoffs exist between the various types of human rights?  Some, such as 
Shue (1980) argue that at least three types of “basic” rights (security, subsistence, 
political) exist—basic in the sense that one cannot be eliminated without infringement 
upon the other types.  Others such as Donnelly (1989) argue that a complex relationship 
exists between many different types of rights, and that they are indivisible. 
 While the theoretical relationship among different types of rights has been 
discussed for many years, only recently have researchers begun to empirically investigate 
the relationships among them.  Milner, Poe, and Leblang (1999) provide a preliminary 
exploration into the interrelationships among security, subsistence, and political rights.  
Their research hints that there are not “tradeoffs” between rights.  Instead, rights tend to 
be complementary.  The authors use bivariate correlations to discover that each type of 
right is related to each of the others in developing countries.  There is much work to be 
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done in this area in order to isolate specific instances where tradeoffs may or may not be 
possible. 
2.2 Links Between Societal Fractionalization and Regime Performance? 
 
Does a high level of diversity in a country, on balance, lead to higher or lower 
levels of government respect for individual rights?  Among the proponents of diversity is 
Amitai Etzioni (1992) argues that people do not desire a homogeneous nation-state, but 
instead seek efficacy and representation within their existing country.  Consequently, the 
key to a country’s development is for governments to accommodate the political, 
economic, and social needs of individuals.  Etzioni warns of the disastrous centrifugal 
forces that can tear economies and societies apart.  He believes that since compromise is 
a necessary condition for democracy, diverse societies may have an advantage over 
“socially monolithic” societies, because by their very existence they have recognized the 
need for compromise.   
Rothschild (1981) contends that the presence of multiple ethnic groups facilitates 
development planning because these groups are logical choices for administrative units: 
Ethnic groups are more serviceable units than socioeconomic classes are 
for organizing the distribution of the benefits that the state allocates and 
for managing the tensions that accrue from this distribution…[Thus] 
ethnic groups learn that organization is a necessary condition for achieving 
political recognition and extracting socioeconomic awards; governments, 
in turn, find that this ethnic group consolidation facilitates the 
performance of their distributive and allocative responsibilities, and hence 






In addition, diversity is beneficial because ethnic cleavages often facilitate the 
formation of political parties, which are necessary for the emergence of a viable 
democracy. 
Another proponent of diversity, Lord Acton, argued that ethnic and cultural 
divisions, and the desire of such groups for liberty, would serve as a check against other 
groups that might try to gain power: 
The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty…provides 
against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single 
authority, by balancing interest, multiplying associations and giving the 
subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion (1909, 289). 
  
On the other side of the diversity argument, Michael Lind argues for the “liberal 
nationalist” perspective, which contends that nationalism, or “the correspondence of 
nation and state," is a “necessary, if not sufficient condition, for democracy” (1994, 357).  
While multiethnic states may appear and disappear, and boundaries may change, “one is 
usually born into a cultural nation for life" (358).  The presence of a cultural nation leads 
to national communities that are more stable and long-lived than “paper” governments.  
In fact, it is these communities that are capable of forming viable, stable democracies, in 
part due to enduring stability of the “cultural nation.”  He points to the failures of 
multinational states to achieve democracy: Cyprus, Lebanon, Sri Lanka, the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, and Sudan.  Moreover, smaller states tend to be more governable, 
which bodes well for the presence of democracy and a stable record of respect for human 
rights.   
Kuper (1977) argues that ethnicity often trumps other cleavages and alliances, 
which leads to high levels of domestic conflict rather than democratic cooperation.  He 
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offers the situation in Burundi in the early 1960’s, in which the Tutsi majority committed 
genocidal atrocities against member of the Hutu ethnic group, as an example of how the 
primacy of ethnic cleavages can be divisive: 
Democratic representative government rewards the majority, and if the 
electoral process is ethnically defined, then representative government 
becomes the rule of the ethnic majority.  This was the charge the [Tutsi 
minority] Burundi government directed against the colonialist and tribalist 
conception of democracy, with the conception that the ethnic majority had 
the right to control public affairs, and indeed to survive (98). 
 
In short, Kuper argues that in situations where ethnic divisions are highly salient,  
chances for a stable nation with enduring respect for the rights of its citizens are very 
limited.  
 Warning against the possible dangers presented by diversity, M.G. Smith argues 
that “cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes the structural necessity for 
domination by one of the cultural sections.  It… necessitates non-democratic regulation 
of group relationships” (1965, 45).1  This “non-democratic” regulation would almost 
certainly result in the violation of human rights. 
Robert Dahl argues that ethnic groups and subcultures, rather than economic or 
social class, are the primary cleavages to be considered in the analysis of political affairs. 
He joins the debate on the side of those who believe that a multicultural society will be 
difficult to govern: 
Because conflicts among ethnic and religious subcultures are so easily 
seen as threats to one’s most fundamental self, opponents are readily 
transformed into a malign, inhuman “they,” whose menace stimulates and 
justifies the violence and savagery that have been the common response of 
in-group to out-group among all of mankind (1971, 108). 
                                                        
1 The quote by Smith appears in Lijphart (1977, 18). 
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Dahl concludes that “polyarchy,” his term for regimes that perform well both on 
the contestation of political issues and on their level of inclusiveness of persons in the 
political process, is found more frequently in societies with “weak subcultural pluralism” 
(1998, 147).  Only with a certain set of institutional conditions can a state with substantial 
pluralism attain polyarchy.  The underlying difficulty is that: 
 Adherents of a particular culture often view their political demands 
as matters of principle, deep religious or quasi-religious conviction, 
cultural preservation, or group survival.  As a consequence, they consider 
their demands too crucial to allow for compromise.  They are 
nonnegotiable. Yet under a peaceful democratic process, settling political 
conflicts generally requires negotiation, conciliation, compromise (150). 
 
Which argument is correct?  To date, there has been little empirical research on 
the effects of cultural heterogeneity on regime performance regarding subsistence, 
security, and political rights of citizens.  My research will first search for empirical links 
between ethnic fractionalization and rights performance (in order to contribute to 
cumulative knowledge), and will subsequently add to the literature on rights by 
developing and testing hypotheses drawn from major theories about these relationships. 
 This investigation seeks answers to a question that is clearly relevant to the 
human rights situation in the world today.  Ethnic movements for autonomy and 
independence share headlines with anti-immigration backlash, both in the developed and 
developing world.  If the challenge of diversity makes it more likely that a country’s 
government will resort to repression or other violations of individual rights, then a better 
understanding of how this relationship might indeed work would be useful to policy 
makers in the future.  Clearly, if democracy is threatened by diversity, then other types of 
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human rights violations may also be threatened (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 
1999; Davenport 1995; Zanger 2000). 
 This research question is made all the more relevant by the emergence or re-
emergence of a type of ethnonationalism that in many countries threatens the very 
existence of the nation-state.  In a recent work, Benjamin Barber outlines the problem in 
terms that make it clear that the very concept of a nation-state may be under siege: 
In this tumultuous world, the real players are not nations at all but tribes, 
many of them at war with one another.  Their aim is precisely to redraw 
boundaries in order to divide—say Kurdish Iraq or Muslim Sudan or 
Serbian-populated sections of Croatia.  Countries like Afghanistan, 
recently fighting a foreign invader in the name of its national 
independence, have been effectively dismembered: divided among 
Pathans, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks.  This is ethnic membership 
enhanced via national dismembership—or by expulsion or expunction of 
unwanted contaminators, as has occurred in slaughter-happy Rwanda.  Is 
this pandaemonium just an extension of benign efforts at 
multiculturalism?  A natural consequence of a centuries-old impulse to 
self-determination?  Or the appearance of a new disease that has corrupted 
integral nationalism and opened the way to ethnic and religious Jihad? 
(1995, 8-9). 
The source of most research on the relationship between diversity and rights 
performance is the literature on domestic conflict, which falls into two categories: those 
works that contend that high levels of ethnic fractionalization are beneficial, and those 
that argue that it is harmful.  The first approach associates high levels of ethnic diversity 
with low levels of domestic conflict.  Rummel (1992; 1995), in his study of Nazi 
Germany, argues that the more crosscutting societal cleavages in a society, the better.  He 
finds that diversity, culture, region, and religion are not linked to the level of state-
sponsored mass murder in a given society (1995, 21).  In his multivariate study of the 
determinants of politicides and genocides, Krain (1997) finds that the level of ethnic 
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fractionalization has no effect on the number of deaths.  The important factors, according 
to Krain, are shifts in the “political opportunity structure,” which he operationalizes as 
external wars, civil wars, extra-constitutional change, and recent history of 
decolonization within a given state.  However, when Krain adjusts for the duration of 
conflict, he finds that greater levels of ethnic homogeneity are associated with higher 
numbers of genocide deaths.  That is, extreme levels of heterogeneity in a population are 
associated with less intense conflict. 
 Other researchers contend that high levels of ethnic diversity are harmful to 
human rights performance.  Gurr (1995), in his influential Minorities at Risk study, bases 
his research on the premise that ethnic minorities will be more likely to be threatened by 
regimes, especially those groups that are marginalized by society.  He assumes that 
serious ethnopolitical conflict will occur in countries where minorities are threatened or 
pose a threat to the current regime.  Kuper (1979; 1981) argues that while there are 
several types of crosscutting cleavages (religious, regional, economic, etc.) that may 
minimize the level of domestic conflict, ethnic division tends to override these other 
concerns, playing a key role in fostering domestic conflict.  Chalk (1989, 153) contends 
that the elimination of small, relatively isolated groups on the “frontiers of expanding 
societies” represents one of the two major types of genocides. 
        Aside from the conflict literature, little research exists on the relationship between 
cultural diversity and government respect for individual rights.  In the empirical 
literature, at least two works tie the effects of societal heterogeneity to individual rights.  
In a global study of countries which are not members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Wolpin (1986) performs a bivariate analysis of 
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political rights, and finds ethnic fragmentation to be negatively associated with human 
rights.  For his dependent variable, Wolpin uses a composite measure of rights based on 
criteria from Gastil (1981) and Sivard (1991).   
Park (1987) examines more than 100 countries during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
and finds that regimes’ respect for the civil rights of their citizens is positively correlated 
to level of ethnic diversity, level of government spending, percentage of population that 
is Christian, and percentage of the population that is urban .  His dependent variable is 
taken from the Freedom House Civil Rights Index.  His methodology is rather simplistic 
(bivariate analyses) and is not theoretically sophisticated.  
 The only researcher who attempts to analyze the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on 
human rights using a multivariate regression technique is Milner (1998).  Using a pooled 
cross-sectional time series (PCTS) design in a study of 126 countries across 8 years 
(1981-1988) and 126 countries, ethnolinguistic homogeneity was not found to have an 
effect on the level of physical integrity rights (as measured by Amnesty International and 
Freedom House).  In the Milner study, economic development was the dominant 
predictor of government respect for human rights. However, Milner only investigated the 
relationship between diversity and one type of basic right: security or personal integrity 
rights.  The same pattern may not necessarily hold for other types of rights, such as 
political or subsistence rights. 
The fact that researchers have not yet identified any type of relationship between 
diversity and basic human rights in a pooled cross-sectional time series design such as 
that employed by Poe and Tate (1994) should not hinder a search for the relationship 
between these two phenomena.  The number of time points available is extremely limited 
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or nonexistent for diversity measures making a time series type of design both 
impractical and imprecise.  Therefore, other types of analysis are necessary to examine 
the relationship between diversity and human rights. 
One starting point for a full-scale attempt to properly identify the relationship 
between diversity and government respect for basic human rights is the study by Walker 
and Poe (2002).  The authors explore this relationship for the developing world using 
1990 as their year of analysis. Between 75 and 118 countries are included in the analysis, 
depending on what data were available for particular measures. Using scatter plots and 
bivariate analyses in order to identify relationships among the data, they find several 
linkages between cultural diversity and lower levels of rights provision by regimes.   
With regard to economic and subsistence rights, the authors employ a visual 
inspection of the data and find evidence that ethnolinguistic homogeneity may 
approximate a sufficient condition for a minimally acceptable level of subsistence, as 
measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI).  They also find that high PQLI 
performance did not occur in those countries where extremely high levels of diversity 
were present.  Bivariate analyses show that the relationship between ethnolinguistic 
heterogeneity and PQLI performance is statistically insignificant, and offer mixed 
support for the same linkage between diversity and lower per capita domestic product. 
In the category of political and civil rights, Walker and Poe find bivariate 
evidence that high levels of ethnolinguistic homogeneity within a country may be 
necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for civil rights, as measured by the Freedom 
House civil rights measure.  They do not find a similar relationship between diversity and 
political rights as measured by Freedom House.  While they find no relationship between 
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ethnolinguistic homogeneity and women’s political and legal equality (as measured by 
Humana), they find that high levels of diversity virtually preclude a high score on the 
Humana measure for social and economic inequality. 
  Interestingly, Walker and Poe find no relationship between ethnolinguistic 
diversity and the third type of basic human rights, security rights.   This apparent lack of 
a relationship may be the reason why quantitative scholarly research has so far not 
analyzed the relationship between rights and diversity, since the bulk of the literature has 
concerned itself with identifying determinants of security rights rather than other types.  
While the authors find scattered, rather than overwhelming, evidence for a relationship 
between higher diversity and lower respect for rights, it is significant to note that in no 
category of basic rights do they find any evidence for the opposite type of relationship.  
In other words, there is simply no support in any of the analyses for the hypothesis that 
higher levels of diversity lead to higher levels of respect for human rights.  
2.3  Cultural Characteristics and Political Conflict: Theoretical Links 
 
Why might cultural factors affect the propensity of states to protect the rights of 
their citizens?  While one may argue, based on the above discussion, that the academic 
literature regarding cultural diversity and human rights is not well developed, social 
scientists have proposed several links between the presence of cultural cleavages and 
group conflict.  This section will provide a brief discussion of the ethnic conflict 
literature, followed by a review of the possible contributions of pluralist theory and social 
stratification theory to my research efforts.  
A review of the literature on ethnicity and human rights would be incomplete 
without a discussion of the ethnic conflict literature, and without a discussion of two 
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other attempts to explain how group dynamics may lead to political problems in 
culturally diverse societies: the ethnic conflict literature and pluralist theory.  
a. The Ethnic Conflict Literature 
Since much of the social science research on ethnicity has focused on ethnic 
conflict, there may be clues to the relationship between diversity and human rights in this 
research.  With the end of colonialism and the rise of ethnonationalism, it became 
apparent to some social scientists that ethnic clashes might become one of the salient if 
not the salient factor in politics.  Karl Deutsch writes: "not long ago, the proposition was 
advanced that increased political consciousness could be expected to consolidate the 
unity of states with homogeneous populations and ‘strain or destroy’ the cohesion of 
states with diverse populations" (Deutsch 1961, 501).  Deutsch is advancing the argument 
that an increase in political consciousness is more likely to emerge and to be consolidated 
in states with homogeneous populations, and to harm the cohesion of states with diverse 
populations.  However, very few states in the modern world are homogeneous, making 
the possibility of national consolidation through cultural unity a rarity. 
 Moreover, this emphasis on national unity has led to what Horowitz calls 
"worldwide institutional and ideological currents" that have led to the growth in ethnic 
conflict, since as the focus in developing countries shifted away from getting rid of the 
colonial power, groups began to "compare their standing in society against that of groups 
in close proximity" (1985, 5).  The global reality is that we live in a state system, and 
therefore as group conflicts emerged in the post-colonial period the ultimate goal of many 
groups was the establishment of their own separate nation-states.  Thus, Horowitz argues, 
"the ubiquitous character of ethnic conflicts opens opportunities for groups and 
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movements to become part of a broad and respectable current…its terminology is the 
language of competition and equality, a remarkably individualist idiom for claims that are 
advanced on a collective basis” (1985, 5). 
What leads groups into conflict with other groups and with the state?  Gurr (2000) 
points out four characteristics of groups and their immediate political environments that 
may explain when and why groups are likely to mobilize to act upon their political 
grievances: the salience of communal identity; group incentive for ethnopolitical action; 
group capacity for ethnopolitical action; and group opportunities for ethnopolitical action 
(47).  Similarly, Drake and Clayton present five factors that they believe lead to ethnic 
conflict: unequal distribution of material benefits; control of government; dispute over 
language policy; prestige; and autonomy (1962, 279). 
According to Gurr and Harff, there is not a comprehensive or well-accepted 
theory that explains the "causation or consequences" of ethnic conflict (1994, 78).  A 
handful of approaches have dealt with why ethnic groups may mobilize and enter into 
conflict with each other or with their government. 
Gurr and Harff propose three theoretical approaches to ethnic conflict.  An early 
theory that related to ethnic groups and conflict (although it certainly attempted to 
explain much more than this particular relationship) was modernization theory.  This 
theory's proponents (Deutsch 1953; Apter 1965) argued that urbanization and increased 
literacy would obscure tribal and other cultural boundaries between peoples by breaking 
down "parochial" ethnic group identities and replacing them with loyalty to a broader 
community such as a candidate, party, nation, or even an entity such as  "pan-Africa" 
(Gurr and Harff 1994, 78).  The explosion of ethnic conflict in recent decades, both in the 
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developed and even in the developing world, has clearly cast a great deal of doubt upon 
the ability of modernization theory ability to explain relationships among ethnic groups.  
A competing approach for explaining ethnic conflict, the primordialist perspective, 
argues that ethnic and religious identities have deep social, historical, and genetic 
foundations.  From this perspective, modernization is a threat to ethnic solidarity, which 
prompts minorities to mobilize in defense of their culture and way of life (78). 
The authors state that an alternative to primordialism is the instrumentalist 
explanation for ethnic mobilization and conflict.  According to the instrumentalist 
perspective, the main goals of a group are assumed to be material and political gains; 
cultural identity is invoked only as means to attain these goals. 2  The most important 
effect of modernization is to increase economic differences, or awareness and resentment 
of difference, between dominant groups and minorities. “Political entrepreneurs” 
capitalize on these differences to establish ethnically based political movements aimed at 
increasing the economic and political well being of their group or region (1994, 78). 
Gurr and Harff argue that the primordial and instrumental views are not 
fundamentally inconsistent: 
We think ethnic groups are most likely to mobilize when both 
conditions—a strong sense of ethnic group identity in combination with 
imposed disadvantages—are present.  Recent theories of specific kinds of 
ethnic conflict incorporate both conditions.  Scholars have proposed, for 
example, that secessionist movements like those of Kurds and Miskitos 
result from three general conditions: the existence of a separate 
ethnonational community or society; actual or perceived disadvantages in 
comparison with the central government; and territorial contiguity (79). 
 
                                                        
2See Tilly 1978 for a general discussion of instrumentalism. 
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While it may seem intuitive that some combination of these factors may lead to 
ethnic conflict under certain circumstances, this type of analysis begs the question of  
exactly what those circumstances are.  Patchen argues that conditions alone do not  
necessarily lead to conflict.  Rather, conflict most often results when leaders are able to  
harness group sentiments to maximize their own political influence: 
Sometimes particular individuals within a society try to persuade people 
that ethnicity is important.  They may stress similarities that exist between 
members of their own ethnic group and differences, real or imagined, 
between members of their group and other ethnic groups. Leaders or elite 
members of a particular ethnic group may do this because they have a 
vested interest in seeing a sharp division and even conflict between ethnic 
groups. Such divisions may protect and enhance their leadership positions, 
and may lead to their gaining advantages (such as land or positions) as a 
result of the interethnic competition (1998, 18). 
 
Leaders may seek to consolidate their power through appealing for group 
solidarity.  In support of the idea that ethnicity may be used to create division and 
conflict, Brass argues: 
In the movement to create greater internal cohesion and to press more 
effectively ethnic demands against rival groups, ethnic and nationalist 
elites increasingly stress the variety of ways in which members of the 
group are similar to each other and collectively different from others (in 
Patchen 1998, 19). 
 
But even if we accept that group differences can become salient when they are 
exploited by elites, we still know little about the circumstances that determine when 
leaders will choose to emphasize these differences.  An important step in the right 
direction is the work of Snyder (2000).  The author argues that leaders are most likely to 
exploit nationalist tendencies within their countries when democratizing countries begin 
their experience with mass electoral politics.  Specifically, the danger exists in those 
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regimes in which liberal institutions such as toleration for dissent and respect for 
alternative political views are not deeply embedded in societal norms.  In this situation, 
leaders are likely to take advantage of the high level of mass participation by resorting to 
mobilization based along ethnic lines.  Thus “ethnic identities might arise during the 
transition process and then become locked in as the new ethno-democracy 
institutionalizes its electoral processes, political parties, and rule of law for the majority.”  
Politics in the democratizing society will “coalesce around a distinctive cultural or ethnic 
core," and toleration for other ethnic or cultural group will vanish (Snyder 352). 
 The general theme in the conflict literature is that cultural groupings can be 
important under certain conditions.  The arguments tend be somewhat tautological—we 
can expect ethnic conflict to erupt in those places where ethnic divisions leave the society 
ripe for conflict.  According to Gurr (2000): 
Ethnic identity may lead to political action when it has collective 
consequences for a group in its relations with other groups and with 
states…more exactly, to the extent that ethnicity is a major determinant of 
a people’s security, status, material well-being, or access to political 
power, it is likely to be a highly salient part of their identity…when ethnic 
identity is highly salient, it is likely to be the basis for mobilization and 
political action (6). 
 
Another example of this tautological basis for ethnic conflict may be found in the 
work of Patchen: 
First, the type of similarities that become most salient are those that most 
affect their interactions.  When differences affect transactions between 





In short, while the ethnic conflict literature does provide clues as to why groups 
may become antagonistic toward one another or toward the state, it does not specify 
when these conflicts may actually take place.3  In other words, to know that when ethnic 
cleavages are salient that they lead to conflict does not tell us how to determine which 
cleavages are indeed salient.  A researcher who wishes to investigate the relationship 
between ethnicity and human rights is left with the impression that, essentially, there are 
certain factors that are important, but that there is no way to identify when they are  
important or not. 
b. Pluralist Theory 
Another area of the social scientific literature that may address why ethnic and 
religious groups may come into conflict is the interest group theory known as pluralism. 
The pluralism literature is familiar to students of American interest group politics.  
Popularized by David Truman (1951), pluralism explains government decisions in terms 
of the interactions between government and interest groups.  According to pluralist 
thought, it is natural for groups and divisions to emerge in politics.  In contrast to the 
Founders, who argued against the "dangers of faction," Truman argued that this type of 
conflict is a legitimate part of the political process.  In a restatement of Truman, Nicholls 
(1974) points out that since in the United States individuals normally belong to several 
groups (as opposed to feeling fully represented by a single one), the phenomenon of 
multiple membership "restrains the activities of organized groups," and membership in 
potential groups serves as a "balance wheel in the American system of government" (24).   
                                                        
3 For an important exception, see Snyder 2000. 
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According to the pluralist conception, individuals and groups compete for power 
and resources within a political "market place" (Nicholls 1974, 27).  The equilibrium that 
emerges between the myriad of economic, religious, ethnic, and geographical interests is 
created by means of "mutual group adjustment” (Connolly 1969, 3).  Such a system is 
both stable and conducive to democracy because every group has an input into public 
policy decisions and because "all major groups share a broad system of beliefs and values 
which encourages conflict to proceed within established channels and allows initial 
disagreements to dissolve into compromise solutions" (1969, 3).  
However, as a theory of interest representation, pluralism does not sharply  
distinguish ethnic groups from other types of groups in a pluralist society.  Robert Dahl, a 
leading pluralist scholar, claims that "ethnic and religious loyalties--like region, status 
occupation, and economic position--do not as such produce sharp political cleavages" 
(1961, 356).  Yet just as "interest group" pluralism itself has been attacked for 
minimizing the inherent biases toward organized interests (Hale 1969; Connolly 1969; 
Olson 1965; Schattschneider 1960), it has also been criticized for not appreciating the 
role of ethnic groups.  A major problem, according to Horowitz, is that "process" theories 
of democracy (such as Truman's conceptualization of pluralism) were formulated at a 
time when ethnic conflict and mobilization was at a minimum, and concern themselves 
with the question of "who gets what."  While power may be nice to have, it is primarily a 
"means to some future apparent good" (1985, 186).   
Donald Horowitz, a scholar of ethnic conflict, argues that we should view power 
not only as a means to secure "tangible goods and benefits," but also as a valued 
commodity in and of itself: 
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Power is the main goal at both ends of a spectrum.  At one end, power is 
sought purely for its value in confirming a claimed status.  To attain the 
status, power need hardly be exercised; the main thing is to gain it.  At the 
other end, power is sought as a means to goals so diffuse, so remote, so 
difficult to specify, that attainment of power becomes, again, an end in 
itself.  This latter case depicts many situations in international politics, 
where power is sought to prevent the emergence of direct but distant and 
dimly perceived consequences.  So critical and dangerous are those feared 
consequences that it is deemed vital to take steps to avert them far in 
advance of their likely occurrence.  In short, power may be desired, not 
only for the lesser things it can gain, but also for the greater things it 
reflects and prevents.  Power in these two latter senses--confirming status 
and averting threat—usually entails an effort to dominate the environment, 
to suppress differences, as well as to prevent domination and suppression 
by others (1985, 187). 
 
Horowitz likens "ethnic systems" to the international system, in the sense that 
groups seek power in order to survive: "the fear of ethnic domination and suppression is a 
motivating force for the acquisition of power as an end” (188).  In the post-colonial 
period, as empires faded, ethnic groups feared that their subordination to colonial powers 
would be replaced by subordination to another cultural group.  It was this fear of 
domination of outsiders that may have led to the high degree of ethnic tension in post-
colonial ethnic states (Coleman and Rosberg 1964, 690). 
A group can use its power to confirm its ethnic status through pursuing greater 
status in terms of citizenship, electoral representation, or official religious or ethnic 
representation.  Indeed, Horowitz argues, very much in contrast to the view of the 
pluralists, that the symbolic needs of ethnic groups for higher status often take 
precedence over group needs and interests (188).  Thus, he believes that to conceive of 
conflict between groups as a matter of entitlement (a joint function of comparative worth 
and legitimacy) "explains why the followers follow, accounts for the intensity of group 
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reactions, even to modest stimuli, and clarifies the otherwise mysterious quest for public 
signs of group status" (226). 
Another weakness of pluralism is that its narrow focus on group relationships 
tends to ignore or minimize other contextual and environmental factors that may 
influence group behavior: 
Truman has been criticized for failing to see that group structure and 
activity in a particular state can be understood only in the context of the 
whole 'political system'.  The manner in which groups operate, it is 
suggested, will depend upon the way in which power is distributed in a 
country, and upon the way in which decisions are made (Nicholls, 23). 
 
Because pluralism does not distinguish ethnic and cultural groups from  
other types of societal groups, it does not add conceptually to an attempt to understand 
the relationship between cultural diversity and respect for human rights.4  Moreover, 
pluralism is a theory that focuses on how societies can stay in equilibrium, not on the 
causes of conflict.  According to pluralism, political order more or less naturally arises 
from the process of groups acting upon the interests of their members.  This lack of 
attention to ethnicity can only lead the reader to two conclusions: either that ethnic 
groups in a society are not distinguishable from other types of societal interests with 
regard to political behavior; or, if differences do exist, that they are benign and can still 
be incorporated into a pluralist framework. 
c. Social Stratification Theory 
Social stratification theory is another area of social scientific inquiry that may 
affect how groups relate to one another and to the state.  With origins in sociology, social 
                                                        
4 Truman does distinguish formal from informal groups, but does not deal with cultural groups specifically. 
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stratification theory is an attempt to study the unequal distribution of power, prestige, 
rights and obligations in society due to one’s position in society (rather than due to 
individual attributes such as genetics or skills) (Littlejohn, 1972, 4).  Essentially, the 
motivation for this theory is to provide an explanation for how societies with differently 
ranked social groups such as caste or class can survive.  Its structural-functionalist roots 
provide a clue to the answer: societies need to survive, and therefore develop an internal 
differentiation in order to integrate the various parts of society into a working whole.  If 
members of society accept this moral order, then conflict and chaos can be minimized.  
Social stratification, or differential ranking of individuals according to their “various 
social roles and activities," occurs in virtually all societies (Barber 1957, 3). 
At first glance, social stratification may appear to be a purely divisive force, but in 
fact its proponents present it as a mechanism for keeping societies in working order. 
Wesolowski argues that since the uneven distribution of material rewards and prestige is 
functionally necessary, social stratification is a “necessary and permanent feature of 
society.”  Furthermore, since society needs a “mechanism” to match social positions with 
particular skills and training, social stratification provides the rewards and prestige to 
induce individuals to take particular societal positions (Wesolowski 1966, 167).  
According to Lipset and Bendix, individuals desire to change their status within the social 
structure because, as self-interested individuals, they can obtain favorable self-evaluation 
of themselves if they can improve their class positions (1960, 61; see also Davis and 
Moore 1945).  Societal mobility arises within a system of social stratification when 
individuals “resist and reject and inferior status” (Lipset and Bendix 1960, 63). 
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How might social stratification theory explain group mobilization and conflict?  
Lipset and Bendix argue that while many political scientists believe that high rates of 
social mobility are related to high rates of political stability (and vice versa), the presence 
of high mobility in “a society in which family background and inherited status are 
strongly emphasized” may have a destabilizing effect (1960, 260).  The authors add that 
in industrializing societies, social mobility only contributes to stability when people 
believe that the system of rewards is fair, because “a lack of belief in the possibility of 
achievement may cause considerable resentment in the lower class” (279). 
Perceived unfairness among groups is a threat to political stability because people 
who believe that the social ranking system in their society is unfair will lose faith in the 
society’s moral authority to allocate resources: 
Men have a sense of justice fulfilled and of virtue rewarded when 
they feel that they are fairly ranked as superior and inferior by the 
value standards of their own moral community. This sense of justice 
is an important element in the integration of society.  Without it, men 
tend to cause conflict or become apathetic, and in either case the 
society is in some measure less well integrated (Barber, 7).  
 
How might social stratification theory improve our understanding of how ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic cleavages may be related to social unrest?  According to 
Rossides, economic and political power may center around particular ethnic, religious, or 
racial groups within diverse societies.  While in wealthy industrialized nations class and 
prestige may or may not coincide with ethnicity and race,5 the link between cultural  
attributes such as ethnicity and religion to class, power, and prestige is much  
                                                        
5 For a description of how social stratification and cultural group membership can have cross-cutting 
effects, see Barber (1957, 58) 
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stronger in “preindustrial” societies (1976, 33). Lieberson argues that ethnic stratification, 
as opposed to economic or class stratification, is unique because it is usually the basis for 
the “disintegration” of a nation state: 
Ethnic groups are the only strata that have the inherent potential to 
carve their own autonomous and permanent societies from the 
existing nation without, in effect recreating its earlier form of 
stratification all over again.  Political separatism offers a solution to 
disadvantaged groups in an ethnic stratification system that is not 
possible for groups disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, or 
economic stratification (1970, 173). 
 
Ethnicity, then, is especially important to students of group conflict because it 
provides the fault lines across which fights for national self-determination are drawn.  
Ethnic groups are special because they are the most likely to be autonomy seeking, and 
by extension may be the most likely to come into conflict with other groups or with the 
state.   Lieberson argues that this “theoretical potential for fission that marks ethnic 
strata” is borne out by empirical observation, as most separatist movements are grounded 
in ethnic group movements.  He gives the examples of Biafra, Canada, and Europe after 
World War I (1970, 174).  According to Lieberson: 
The most fundamental difference between ethnic and other forms of 
stratification lies in the fact that the former is nearly always the basis 
for the internal disintegration of the existing boundaries of a nation-
state…ethnic groups are the only strata that have the inherent 
potential to carve their autonomous and permanent society from the 
existing nation without, in effect, recreating its earlier form of 
stratification all over again.  Political separatism offers a solution to 
disadvantaged groups in an ethnic stratification system that is not 
possible for groups disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, or 




Nonetheless, Lieberson concludes that it is difficult to assess the effects of 
ethnicity on stability because of the complex relationship between ethnic and economic 
stratification.  The strength of the work is that it shows that ethnic stratification is not 
only distinct from economic, gender, or age-based stratification, but that this difference 
may mean that ethnicity may be a greater source of conflictual behavior than other types 
of differences.  The weakness is that while it clarifies that ethnicity is more likely to lead 
to conflict than other types of social classifications (economic, gender, age, etc), it does 
not provide any clues as to when these differences will matter.  As is the case with the 
ethnic conflict literature, social stratification theory is helpful in showing that ethnicity 
may be important, but does not specify the condition under which it will matter.   While it 
may intuitively seem clear that when people feel they are receiving unequal rewards or 
prestige for their efforts, they may not be happy with their society.  However, violent or 
conflictual behavior is only one possible outcome of this feeling.  We cannot say that 
stratification along cultural lines will cause problems in highly mobile stratification 
systems, only that it might do so.   
An interesting scholarly attempt to outline the potential effects of social 
stratification based on ethnicity in society is offered by Himmelstrand (1969).  Using a 
hypothetical Ibo and a hypothetical Yoruba citizen in Nigeria, the author attempts to 
create a simplified model of how individuals may respond to the differential rewards 
afforded them by society under a system of ethnic stratification. In this highly simplified 
scenario, a high-achieving citizen of a lower-ranked tribe is not afforded the same social 
standing as an equally wealthy member of a more highly ranked tribe.  This unequal 
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status between ascribed status and level of achievement conferred to equally achieving 
members of different groups is referred to as ‘rank inequivalence’ (85).   
If a member of the lower-ranked group accepts his inferior status, or is unable in 
any way to affect it, then that person does not behave in any way to change it. Yet if this 
same person does not accept this relative ranking system, he may engage in what 
Himmelstrand terms “rank equilibration."  Individuals may attempt to improve their 
social ranking in several ways: they may segregate themselves so that they may cease to 
interact with the other group, thus avoiding comparisons; they may conceal their ethnic 
status; they may assimilate into the higher-ranking cultural group; or they may engage in 
activities that are intended to change the social evaluation of their own ethnic group (i.e., 
by promoting egalitarianism or by trying to improve their group’s level of access to 
higher positions).  A final way in which individuals may respond to inequivalence in 
ranking is to engage in aggressive behavior (86). 
Just as individuals in the group with a lower ascribed status may engage in rank-
equilibrating behavior, individuals in the higher ascribed group may respond to this 
behavior with rank reasserting behavior.  Himmelstrand claims that rank reassertion 
among Yoruba in Northern Nigeria led to chauvinistic, nativistic, and xenophobic 
behavior, which in turn drove Ibos to attempt a secessionist movement in the South.  This 
simplistic model does not capture many of the inevitable complexities involved in ethnic 
conflict and mobilization, but it provides a rich theoretical description of how the process 
may take place.  It is certainly possible that rank equilibration and rank reassertion are 




2.4  Summary and Conclusions 
It is apparent from the above discussions of ethnicity and conflictual behavior that 
cultural attributes of a population may, under conditions of ethnic saliency, contribute to 
political instability, conflict, and by extension, human rights violations.  What the studies 
lack is any kind of description of when ethnicity will matter. The goal of my research is 
find out if one particular aspect of ethnicity—the level of diversity within given society—
can affect the level of respect for basic human rights enjoyed by that country’s citizens.  
While it has so far failed to adequately address this particular question, the academic 
literature has provided us with enough insight to demand further empirical research into 
the effects of ethnicity on the surrounding social environment, providing interesting 
reasons to investigate the relationship between diversity and government provision of 
basic human rights. 
Clearly, the effect of cultural heterogeneity on the level of government respect for 
individual remains open to inquiry.  There is certainly no shortage in the literature of 
discussion that may tie diversity to human rights in one way or another.  There are 
several theorists who link cultural diversity to both beneficial (e.g., Etzioni, Acton) and 
harmful (e.g. Dahl, Lind) societal outcomes.  The conflict literature contains a number of 
additional theoretical discussions that attempt to tie the phenomenon of ethnic diversity to 
conflict. Likewise, there are several empirical studies that examine the relationship 
between diversity and conflict.  In addition, pluralism and social stratification theory are 
two perspectives that may someday be applied to ethnic groups in a manner that helps to 
explain why high levels of diversity are beneficial or harmful. Yet in the social science 
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literature there remains a lacuna of empirical research that explores the relationship 
between cultural diversity and human rights.  This dissertation addresses this gap. 
 I believe that this investigation into the relationship between diversity and human 
rights is warranted.  First, the preliminary research of Walker and Poe (2002) suggests the 
existence of several untapped relationships between various conceptions of diversity and 
the different subtypes of basic human rights.  Second, the sheer variety of quantitative 
literature linking diversity to rights violations, instability, violence, and poor government 
performance suggests that the extant evidence of negative effects of cultural 
heterogeneity on human rights performance has implications for human rights research.  
Finally, a number of studies suggest that ethnic and other cultural divisions may play a 
special role in conflictual political behavior.  One might expect to observe some 
relationship, then, between rights violations and the nature of cultural divisions. 
The next chapter will provide some theoretical arguments for the circumstances 
under which the level of cultural diversity may matter, and will provide testable 






CHAPTER 3  
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
The theoretical underdevelopment of the relatively new field of human rights 
research has both advantages and disadvantages.  One advantage is that a researcher 
enjoys great leeway in formulating new theoretical propositions.  On the negative side, 
the limited amount of literature that addresses this topic provides little theoretical 
guidance.  Thus, researchers must draw upon their own resources in order to develop 
theory with testable propositions.  Clearly, the relationship between cultural diversity and 
regime respect for human rights is an under explored one. Consequently, rather than 
building extensively upon existing theory, it is necessary to build a theoretical 
explanation for this relationship using diverse strains in the literature that only indirectly 
relate to this research question. 
 This chapter has three primary functions.   First, it will present plausible 
theoretical arguments about the relationship between cultural diversity and human rights 
in order to generate testable hypotheses.  Second, it will discuss the available data that 
can be used to operationalize the concepts contained in these hypotheses.  Finally, it will 
outline the procedure that will be used to empirically evaluate these hypotheses. 
3.1 Toward a Theory of Diversity and Subsistence Rights  
 Recently, quantitative researchers have begun to examine a broader range of basic 
rights, including not only security and political rights, but economic and subsistence 
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rights as well (Dixon 1984; Spalding 1986; Moon and Dixon 1985; Rosh 1986; Moon 
1991; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999). 
 At present, there are no published empirical studies that directly address the 
relationship between the level of ethnic or religious diversity in a society and the 
enjoyment of subsistence rights by citizens in that society.  Therefore, I will present 
several plausible arguments regarding the nature of this relationship. Although the 
previous chapter contains references to a long-standing debate between those who believe 
cultural diversity is beneficial and those who believe it is harmful, I believe that the 
former argument is more convincing than the latter.  Therefore, I will present a plausible 
argument for the beneficial effects of homogeneity.  There are two somewhat related 
reasons –one economic and one political— that have a basis in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. 
 
a. Efficiency   
The first argument is from the economic literature.  Many related arguments can 
be found that tie societal homogeneity to economic efficiency.  The argument may thus 
be made that regimes in homogeneous societies can respond to the basic economic needs 
of their citizens because it is easier for them to respond to the needs of their citizens than 
is the case in a more diverse society. 
Therefore, the first reason that high levels of ethnic or religious diversity may lead 
to poor subsistence rights in a given country is because of a loss of efficiency due to the 
needs of responding to diverse groups and interests.  Societal institutions are not able to 
perform as well because they must deal with a varied and confusing set of norms, values, 
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and beliefs.  In turn, the government has fewer resources available for meeting the needs 
of its citizens, including basic human needs such as education, nutrition, and sanitation. 
A starting point for the relationship between diversity in society and individual 
rights can be found in the literature on language and economic development.  
Specifically, the sociolinguistic literature is used as a starting point for a theory of 
economic development.  Coulmas (1992) argues that there are strong reasons to believe 
that linguistic homogeneity is a necessary condition for economic development, and that 
it is actually modernization, rather than the presence of a common language, that is the 
causal factor for development.  One of the necessary social and cultural alterations that a 
country must make in order to develop is that it must develop a common language.  Only 
a common language that is “fully adapted and understood throughout the nation” is 
capable of “absorbing and giving expression to Western knowledge” (1992:50).  
 LaPonce (1987) argues that using more than one language carries a high 
computational cost, since the brain’s neuropsychological limitations limit our ability to 
register, code, and decode words from one language to another.  The complexity of any 
interaction that involves translation increases the complexity of transaction dramatically, 
which means that it is much more “costly” to communicate with another individual in a 
non-native language. 
The economic reasoning for the desirability of a common language will be  
familiar to students of economic historian Douglass North (1990).  Essentially, by 
adapting a common language, countries can minimize societal transaction costs 
by developing institutions that reduce the level of “uncertainty."  At the heart of 
North’s argument is the idea that cultural norms are stored and transmitted via 
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language, which can structure institutions in ways that limit transaction costs and 
allow countries to develop a cultural filter that provides “continuity, so that the 
informal solution to exchange problems in the past carries over into the present 
and makes those informal constraints important sources of continuity in long-run 
societal change” (37). 
The economic literature also links cultural and religious homogeneity to 
economic development and thus indirectly, one might reason, to better provision 
of basic human needs.  Fukuyama theorizes that social capital, which he defines 
as “an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between individuals” 
is often a byproduct of religion, tradition, shared historical experience, and “other 
types of cultural norms” (2000, 3).  He believes social capital is largely primordial 
in nature; i.e., it cannot be easily stimulated or created by governments or social 
interactions. 
 How might language and culture contribute to the ability of countries to respect 
and promote the individual economic and political rights of their citizens?  As has already 
been noted, there is a link between economic development and the tendency for countries 
to honor security, subsistence, and political rights.  Beyond this empirical observation, 
however, one may argue that political institutions are not so different from economic 
ones.  Therefore, if countries can minimize uncertainty and promote the efficiency and 
flexibility of their formal and informal institutions, they can enjoy good long-term 
economic and political performance.  Political as well as economic norms are embedded 
in the institutional structure of societies, so it is likely that countries with flexible and 
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efficient institutions over a long period of time will also have deeply embedded norms 
that favor economic efficiency and responsiveness to the basic needs of citizens. 
In the empirical economic literature, several works have appeared in recent years 
that support the idea that economic efficiency is associated with higher levels of ethnic 
homogeneity.  In a cross-national study performed for the World Bank, Kuijs (2000) 
finds that higher economic efficiency is positively correlated with higher levels of ethnic 
homogeneity.  Moreover, the more diverse a country’s population, the less likely it is to 
make public goods expenditures on health and education.  In a sense, then, ethnic 
diversity may represent a double disadvantage for a society by providing lower technical 
efficiency and less productive social spending.  Arcand et al. find that, at least for 
societies with high illiteracy rates and comparatively dense populations, ethnic diversity 
is correlated with low rates of economic growth, largely because it “encourages the 
adoption of policies associated with rent-seeking activities” (2000, 6).  It is possible, 
then, that governments in countries with high levels of cultural diversity may be less 
likely to respond to the subsistence needs of their citizens because regimes feel pressured 
to allocate scarce resources to placate the needs of competing societal groups rather than 
in meeting basic human needs.  
b. Appeasement of Groups   
A second reason why diverse countries may have lower levels of subsistence 
rights is more directly tied to a political explanation.   Because political officials in 
societies with high levels of heterogeneity may feel the need to allocate a higher 
proportion of their resources to goods that benefit only specific subgroups in order to 
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maintain order and stability in their societies, they are likely to allocate fewer resources 
to public goods such as those that may help to satisfy basic human needs requirements. 
It is quite possible that diverse societies are more likely to be politically unstable.  
In a cross-national large-N study of a global sample of developed and developing 
countries, Annett (2000) finds that countries that are diverse across ethnolinguistic and 
religious lines tend to be more unstable than countries that are not.  Using a composite 
index of nine measures of instability, a two-stage least squares analysis reveals that 
across three time periods (1960-1980), government size (as measured by government 
consumption) is positively associated with high levels of social diversity.  In other words, 
governments spend more money attempting to placate groups in society, minimizing the 
risk of being overthrown. 
 This sub-optimal use of government resources may lead governments to under-
invest in the poor and to skew economic benefits toward a few key members or groups in 
society rather than to a rather broad cross-section of society.  A lack of economic 
development and rights for citizens may be a result of an ethnically diverse population.   
 Aside from the indirect link between heterogeneity and provision of economic 
goods, what else might account for lower levels of government concern for subsistence 
rights in diverse polities?  The economics literature has produced a large body of research 
linking poor governance to governments that face socially heterogeneous populations.   
 In a study of African nations, Easterly and Levine (1997) find a strong negative 
correlation between diversity (as measured by linguistic fragmentation) and government 
provision of public goods, operationalized by numbers of telephones, percentage of roads 
paved, efficiency of the electrical network, and years of schooling. Likewise, in a study 
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of United States cities, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1998) find that, even after controlling 
for a number of socioeconomic and demographic factors, productive public goods are 
provided in inverse relation to the level of ethnic fractionalization in a given city. 
 There may be many reasons for this empirical link, but one of the key theoretical 
arguments is derived from the public finance literature.  Tiebout (1956) argues that 
heterogeneous societies are unlikely to provide for the welfare of all of their citizens 
unless people are allowed to sort themselves into communities that provide the public 
goods that they want.  In a United States-based study, Luttmer reports “individuals 
increase their support for welfare spending if a larger fraction of welfare recipients in 
their area belongs to their racial group" (1997, 1).  To summarize the rationale for why 
ethnic particularism might lead to underproduction of important public goods, Alesina et 
al. (1997) offer the following two points: 1) Groups have different preferences; and 2) 
Utility to one group of using a particular resource is reduced if another group can use it.  
In other words,  
If a white person perceives that a public good [the authors give the 
example of a new expressway] is enjoyed mostly by black citizens, he 
would oppose it precisely for that reason.  In other words, the identity of 
the beneficiaries of the public good directly influences the utility level of 
each individual.  This mechanism would reinforce the argument…that 
more ethnic fragmentation leads to fewer resources pooled together to 
provide non-excludable goods (12). 
 
Thus, governments in diverse societies may be inclined to spend less than their 
more homogeneous counterparts on public goods necessary to basic human needs such as 









Hypothesis 1. The more (the less) culturally homogeneous a society, the 
greater (the lesser) the realization of subsistence rights in that country. 
 
 
3.2   Toward a Theory of Diversity and Security Rights 
 
In recent years, security rights have increasingly fallen under the analytical 
scrutiny of quantitative researchers (Stohl and Carleton 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
1985; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Fein 
1995; Cingranelli and Richards 1997, Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  Researchers have 
focused on understanding the determinants and extent of coercive activities by 
governments, including but not limited to torture, forced disappearance, murder, and 
imprisonment of persons for their political views.  Such government acts are designed to 
induce compliance in others. Compliance may occur not only as a result of direct 
violations of individual security rights, but also because governments use these acts as a 
form of “state terrorism” to induce others to comply after the fact (Poe and Tate 1994, 
854; also see Gurr 1986).  
While to a degree the academic literature (see above) addresses the relationship 
between diversity and economic performance (and by extension provision of economic 
rights), and to a lesser degree political rights, there is little scholarship on the relationship 
between diversity and personal integrity or security rights. 
In keeping with the preponderance of the literature, which holds that diversity 
presents problems for governance, one might attempt to come up with a theoretical basis 
for why a regime in a diverse society might be more likely to repress its citizens, all other 
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things being equal. In order to come up with a theoretical proposition regarding 
repression in a plural society, one must first accept a basic assumption regarding what 
might make a government resort to repression in the first place. I assume that regimes are 
rational in that they seek to maximize their expected utility, and they will act accordingly.  
Primary among these goals is, understandably, to stay in power.  According to Booth and 
Richard (1996): 
Regimes and their supporters employ political repression for simple 
reasons—to manage, reduce, or suppress the activities of their 
opponents, or to shape or limit the level and nature of citizens’ 
demands upon the regime and state. Thus by and large repression is 
instrumental in that it seeks to defend the power, perquisites, and 
resources of rulers and their allies from pressures from other elites 
and from mass publics (1206). 
 
If we assume that leaders will use repression to maximize their goals, then why 
might regimes in more diverse countries in the developing world be more likely to 
repress their citizens?  I look to three possible reasons why these leaders may make this 
decision. 
a. Intense Competition for Resources, Weak State Capacity for Dealing with Group  
Demands 
 
While there is no limit to the amount of demands that can be placed upon the 
state, there is limit to the resources that leaders have to deal with these competing 
demands.  While this situation exists in all countries, these demands appear to present a 
much greater challenge to ruling regimes in the developing world.  Nevitte (1986) offers 
two reasons why this may be the case. First, the level of resources available for 
distribution in developing societies is much lower than is true in the developed world.  
Thus, competition for these scarce resources can be seen as being more intense: 
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Any allocative decision is difficult in an environment of weak institutional 
structures and organizations. But those decisions are even more difficult in 
that environment where there is crippling economic scarcity and an 
absence of significant other crosscutting societal divisions that could 
countervail or moderate ethnic communal identifications (3).  
 
While regimes in developed industrialized countries may often have the option of 
offering payoffs in the form of budgetary transfers to aggrieved groups in exchange for 
some degree of acquiescence, this option is not often possible to the leadership in poorer 
countries because the institutions necessary for such fiscal transfers are not in place.  
Second, in the developed world leaders are often able to limit the demands on the state 
for resources from societal groups with assurances that cooperation in the short term will 
lead to economic growth and prosperity in the long run.  Because developed countries 
have a great deal of economic capacity, they are able to at least offer the credible 
possibility (although certainly not a guarantee) that economic growth and further 
development are possible in a reasonable time frame if aggrieved groups will mute their 
challenges to the state in the name of societal cooperation.  Contrast this situation with 
the one faced by leaders in a developing society, where promises for long-term progress 
in return for short-term cooperation can almost inevitably be met with great skepticism.  
Leaders in countries that have always been poor and underdeveloped cannot easily pacify 
unhappy societal groups with the promise that economic prosperity is only a few years 
away.  Moreover, the possibility of democratic competition as a means of determining 
which resources go where appears to be almost prohibitively difficult in highly plural 
societies, according to both Dahl (1998) and Rabushka and Shepsle (1972).  In short, the 
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prospects for a consensual or bargained method for determining the allocation of scarce 
resources appears to definitely be more difficult in a culturally diverse nation. 
Thus, the inability of leaderships in the developing world to appease disaffected 
groups with promises of side payments or future economic growth leaves them with 
fewer options in dealing with these unhappy segments of society.  One obvious option is 
political repression.  Now, of course it is true that leaders in all poor countries face these 
same problems.  However, the requirements of dealing with a large number of distinct 
cultural groups can not make the task of maintaining order any easier.  Moreover, there 
are two more considerations that may lead societal group demands to be seen as more 
threatening when they occur in ethnically or religiously diverse societies. 
b. Threat to Cooperation from Low Societal Trust and the Unique Nature of Ethnic   
and Cultural Groups 
 
A second consideration is that the nature of civil society in culturally diverse 
countries in the developing world is different than it is in more homogeneous societies.  
Francis Fukuyama is one of the important modern-day civil society theorists.  Clearly, 
social capital, which Fukuyama (2000) defines as “the instantiated informal norm that 
promotes cooperation between two or more individuals,” is a key to the development of 
“the type of associational life [i.e., civil society] that is necessary for the success of 
limited government and modern democracy” (3).  Social capital is necessary to the 
development of “formal coordination mechanisms” such as contracts, bureaucratic rules, 
and hierarchies.  While these mechanisms can exist without social capital, they cannot 
ensure that cooperation will take place. The reason, according to Fukuyama, is that there 
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will be additional “transaction costs of monitoring, negotiating, litigating, and enforcing 
formal agreements" (6).   
However, Fukuyama does not believe that social capital has an automatically 
beneficial effect on society.  While theorists such as Coleman (1988) have described 
social capital as a public good that can be used to develop bonds of trust and cooperation 
among society, Fukuyama is more skeptical, because he believes that the norms 
developed in these human relationships are only fully actualized in dealings with one’s 
friends.  In a diverse society, one would not expect it to be more difficult for things such 
as “trust networks, civil society, and the like” to develop across ethnic and religious 
divides.  As Fukuyama (2000) describes the problem: 
Social capital seems less obviously a social good than physical or 
human capital…[because]…it tends to produce more in the way of 
negative externalities than either of the other two forms.  This is 
because group solidarity in human communities is often purchased at 
the price of hostility toward out-group members. There appears to be 
a natural human proclivity for dividing the world into friends and 
enemies that is the basis of all politics (4).  
 
 The role of social capital in diverse developing societies, then, is an important key 
to understanding the potential problems these societies may experience.  The problem is 
that groups have a low level of trust vis a vis other groups.  The situation is made worse 
in countries where economic modernization has not yet broken down traditional forms of 
culture—“social groups like clans, village associations, religious sects, and the like”—
because these groups have a “very narrow radius of trust” (5).   
In other words, social capital does not spread through the whole society as it does 
in developed industrialized nations; rather, it circulates among individual social groups to 
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a much higher degree.  As a result, the bad effects (what Fukuyama terms “negative 
externalities”) of social capital may lead group members to perceive outsiders with 
“suspicion, hostility, or outright hatred” (4).  If these types of problems exist in a 
comparatively homogeneous society, surely the possibility exists that they might be even 
worse in a society with a multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups, all with their own 
demands and trust networks.  It is certainly possible that one “negative externality” of 
maintaining group solidarity within the ruling group is state-sponsored repression of 
other societal groups. 
While regimes in every country in the world face demands and political pressure 
from a number of societal groups, ethnic differences among groups may be the most 
troublesome ones to deal with.  This is because, at least in the developing world, ethnic 
cleavages may be much more enduring than other types of cleavage.  Nevitte (1986) 
argues that ethnic group memberships are different than other types of group 
memberships. First, it is very difficult or impossible for members to shed their 
identification. Second, ethnic rivalries are one of the basic axes of political conflict, often 
because ethnic factors were a crucial decision in the founding of the state.  The logic 
behind this increased salience becomes clearer when one considers the fact that it is more 
likely to directly threaten regime stability than other types of political rivalries, “even to 
the point of threatening the stability of the regime itself” (5).   
The fact that ethnic identities run deeper than other types may indeed have 
implications for the group in power.  Nevitte’s argument that regime stability is 
threatened by ethnic cleavages is shared by Roeder (2000) who argues that: 
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The escalation of ethnopolitical conflict to ethnonational crises represents 
one of the most threatening domestic challenges to the state since it 
ultimately seeks not only to change the government or the regime, but also 
to change the very boundaries of the state itself (3).   
 
 So the conflict may not just be for immediate control of the state, but for the 
entire history of the nation and the society.  Roeder supports this claim by noting that of 
the six regimes that have “failed” since 1960, all of them have occurred in the 51 most 
ethnically heterogeneous countries in the world (2000, 3).  Clearly, the ethnic politics 
game can be played for very high-stakes. 
Ronen (1986) agrees with Nevitte about the potential destructiveness of the ethnic 
factor in the politics of developing countries:   
Ethnicity is politicized into the ethnic factor when an ethnic group is in 
conflict with the political elite over such issues as the use of limited 
resources or the allocation of benefits—issues that are particularly intense 
in developing Third World countries, where the greater the stakes 
involved, the greater the ethnic factor with which the central government 
must deal (1).  
 
 Although it is not clear beyond a doubt that ethnic problems are worse in 
highly diverse societies than they are in homogeneous societies, this appears to be 
the consensus among many political economists (Collier 1998; Roeder 2000).  
World Bank Development expert Paul Collier argues: "In general, particularly 
among policymakers, there is still a common presumption that 'ethnic hatreds' 
created by communal cleavages are the chief cause of ethnic conflict" (1998, 3).   
 I know of no theoretical literature that directly addresses the relationship between 
diversity and security rights. However, the arguments presented in this section regarding 
the extreme salience of ethnicity in societal power interactions; and the existence of the 
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potential for a large number of “negative externalities” from the social capital developed 
by a large number of groups, leads me to believe that leaders in diverse societies may be 
more willing to repress opposition groups rather than dealing with their demands in some 
more accommodative manner.  
c. The Historical Pattern of Cultural Domination  
 
Finally, we must consider the political patterns with which leaders in diverse 
developing nations are most familiar.  Roeder (2000) notes that both J.S. Furnivall and 
John Stuart Mill believed the predominant method for dealing with a multiplicity of 
societal cultural groups in the developing world is through “domination” (7).  
Domination may result in ethnic control, which Roeder describes as what occurs when “a 
superordinate ethnic segment uses the state as an instrument to control a subordinate 
ethnic segment, and allocate resources in the interests of the group’s elite" (8).1 Mill 
argues that in plural societies, the maintenance of stability requires “a constitutionally 
unlimited, or at least a practically preponderant, authority in the chief rules” (Mill 1962 
[1861], 84).2  During the colonial period it was the responsibility of the colonial power to 
ensure social order.  Generally speaking, the type of rule that the colonial rulers preferred  
was a heavy-handed and top-down style governance.  When countries gained 
independence at the beginning of the post-colonial period, the job of ensuring domestic 
stability obviously fell to whichever group or groups rose to power.  In many if not most  
cases, the method of governance they were most familiar with was the dominant style of  
the former colonial powers.   
                                                        
1 Roeder is summarizing the description of domination presented by Lustick (1979). 
2 The source for this quote by Mill is Roeder (2000), p. 7. 
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Thus, it appears that the historical blueprint for how to govern ethnically diverse 
societies is largely through domination.  Without question, imprisonment, torture, and the 
like were common tools that the colonial powers used to maintain their hold on power.  
Clearly, repression of the right to integrity of all groups in society (not just patently 
ethnic ones) can be considered a logical policy response to unrest in countries where the 
historical pattern of maintaining power in a multiethnic society has been through 
domination.  According to M.G. Smith (1969): 
The monopoly of power by one cultural section is the essential 
precondition for the maintenance of the total society in its current 
form…the dominant section must simultaneously monopolize 
positions of power and immobilize the subject categories by 
suppressing or proscribing their collective political organization 
(155).3 
 
These three factors are obviously not the only ones that leaders must consider 
when deciding how to maintain power.  In fact, there are countless demands on leaders in 
any society, and these factors may not play a predominant role.  However, when taken 
together, these three concerns may have enough of an impact to make a difference in how 
a regime treats its citizens, ceteris paribus.  In other words, all other things being equal, 
we might expect that the ruling group in a highly diverse society might be more likely to 
respond with repression in a given situation than would the ruling regime in a rather  
homogeneous society.    In other words, it will be the purpose of my research to 
investigate whether there is a general trend in the direction of higher government 
repression in more culturally diverse countries.  
                                                        
3 The source for this quote by Smith is Roeder (2000), p. 8. 
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Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001) find that regimes that face more threatening 
levels of activity by opposition groups are more likely to commit security rights 
violations such as torturing and imprisoning political prisoners.  It may be consistent with 
this finding that leaders of more highly diverse countries are more likely to commit 
security rights violations because they perceive a greater level of political threat to their 




Hypothesis 2. The more (the less) culturally homogeneous a society, the 
greater (the lesser) the realization of security rights in that country. 
 
3.3 Operationalization and Data Sources 
 
In order to empirically test the relationship between societal heterogeneity and 
regime respect for individual rights, one must assume that the relevant concepts are 
operationalizable.  However, one must also be able to quantify the key independent 
variable, diversity.  I will now discuss how the concepts of diversity and human rights are 
operationalized, as well as the nature of and sources for the data that I will use.   
a. Independent Variables 
For the purposes of this research project, the causal arrow is hypothesized to run 
from societal heterogeneity in the direction of a number of widely used indicators of 
regime performance. 
In the empirical social science literature, the most popular measure for calculating 
diversity has been the ELF60, (an abbreviation for the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 
Index for the Year 1960) index created by Taylor and Hudson (1960) and later used by 
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Krain (1990) and Annett (2000).  This measure is borrowed from the literature on party 
competitiveness, and uses a scalar number from .01 to .99 to measure the level of 
diversity, with .01 representing the lowest level of diversity and .99 being the highest. 
According to this type of diversity ranking, a highly homogeneous country (for example, 
in the ELF60 index Japan’s score is .01) receives a score close to zero, while an 
ethnically diverse country (such as Nigeria at .86) receives a score close to one.  
The ELF60 measure calculates the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a given country will not belong to the same group.  It can be calculated 
using the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, which can be written as: 
                                           M  
 Fractionalization =  1-Σ(ni /n)
2 , i=1,…., M. 
                             i=1 
 
where N is the total population, M is the number of groups in the country, and ni is the 
number of people belonging to the i-th group.  In this measurement scheme, the 
fractionalization score for a country will increase as does the number of groups and as the 
size of these groups becomes more equal. 
 Two potential problems exist with the using a measure such as ELF60. First, by 
arbitrarily combining two concepts, one may lose information on the true nature of 
variation among human populations.  Second, by relying on a single formula to represent 
human variation, one may draw conclusions that are strongly influenced by this choice of 
measurement. While the concept of societal heterogeneity cannot be perfectly captured in 
a scalar number for a particular country, statistical cross-national studies are well suited 
to this type of measure because one number can be assigned to each country in the study.  
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In the future, more sophisticated measures may be created to more fully capture the 
concept of human heterogeneity, “richness," “evenness,” and other related concepts.4   
Moreover, the ELF60 measure and its offshoots represents the standard measure 
of diversity that has been used in social science over the last three or more decades.  It 
has been used in works on economic growth (Easterly and Levine 1997); social well-
being (Estes 1984); incidence and duration of external intervention into civil wars 
(Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000); interest groups (Muller and Murrell 1986); public sector 
size (McCarty 1993); human development (Lindenberg 1993); and incidence and severity 
of genocide (Krain 1997).  
The two measures I will employ to capture societal heterogeneity are calculated in 
the same manner as the ELF60 measure.  However, they are available for a greater 
number of countries and are more up-to-date.   
The World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index.  This measure is taken 
from Annett (2000).  Calculated exactly the same as the ELF60 index, the World Bank 
index purports to more accurately measure differences within populations.  The diversity 
scores for many of the countries are not similar to their counterparts in the Krain index.  
The World Bank index is correlated with Taylor and Hudson at .86 and Krain at .91.  
Annett’s data source, The World Christian Encyclopedia, possesses several  
advantages.  First, it breaks down the world’s ethnolinguistic groups into extremely fine 
gradations (much more so than does the ELF index).  Second, it is fully updated, unlike 
the Taylor or Krain indices, as all relevant information pertains to the early 1980s.  And  
                                                        
4 For a good discussion of the conceptual and methodological pitfalls of using ELF60 or similar indexes, 
see Reilly (2000) and Laitin and Posner (2001). 
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finally, the World Bank measure is available for a larger number of countries (150 in all), 
although the United Nations does not recognize the independence of many of the 
additional “countries” in the sample (e.g., Puerto Rico, Guadaloupe). 
Two potential disadvantages of this measure are the fact that it is created entirely 
from one source (the World Christian Encyclopedia) and is only available during one 
time period (1990). 
The highest country values for ethnolinguistic diversity variable are .95 
(Tanzania), Uganda (.93), Zambia (.91), Kenya (.90), and India (.90).  The lowest values 
are Saudi Arabia (.06), Comoros (.06), Bangladesh (.07), and Seychelles (.08).  The mean 
value for ethnolinguistic diversity is .54.  
The World Bank Religious Fractionalization Index.  This measure is also 
assembled by Annett (2000).  Also taken from The World Christian Encyclopedia, it is 
calculated just like the other indexes, but measures religious rather than ethnic 
differences.  Apparently the only religious index, it is correlated with the Taylor and 
Hudson (1972) measure at r=.52. and Krain (1997) at r=.38.  This index measures the 
probability that two individuals chosen from a specific country will not belong to the 
same religious group, thus capturing the degree of societal fractionalization across the 
dimension of religion rather than that of ethnolinguistic differences.  According to Annett 
(2000, 13): 
Any religion listed by Barrett as a distinct religion in a given country 
is included in the index.  The only religion that is disaggregated is 
Christianity: the subdivisions include Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Eastern Orthodoxy, Indigenous Christianity, and Crypto-Christians.  
Other groupings include Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Tribal 
religions, Shintoism, Chinese folk religion, as well as a plethora of 
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minor religions (such as Bahai’i).  Furthermore, two secular 
categories are included: Nonreligious and Atheist. 
 
 An obvious shortcoming with this data set is that it does not subdivide major 
religions other than Christianity.  Certainly in the case of Islam, one could argue that the 
political (if not strictly religious) differences between Sunni and Shi’a are significant 
enough to merit a distinction between the two.   
 It should be noted that in an effort to capture the overall effect of societal 
fractionalization on economic performance, Annett combines the religious and 
ethnolinguistic indices into a single equally weighted index.  
 The countries with the highest scores on the religious fractionalization index are 
Kenya (.79), Ghana (.79), Malawi (.75), Cameroon (.75), and Tanzania (.74).  The 
countries with the lowest fractionalization are Yemen, Tunisia, Oman, and Morocco, all 
with a score of .01.  The mean religious fractionalization score is .37, which is quite a bit 
lower than the mean of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (.54). 
 The data for ethnolinguistic and religious diversity for each country in this study 
are available Appendix B. 
b. Dependent Variables  
My dependent variables are two types of basic rights: security rights and 
subsistence rights. 
Economic and Subsistence Rights. The first type of rights that I will treat as a 
dependent variable is subsistence rights, or the degree to which a regime enables its 
citizens to attain the basic economic necessities common to all people.  Subsistence rights 
can broadly be understood to mean a right to access the following necessities: food, 
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clothing and shelter; unpolluted air and water; and some minimal degree of public health 
care.  While the quantitative political science literature has largely focused on security or 
political rights, the means for subsistence must also be available to any individual who 
expects to lead a normal, healthy, and substantive life.   
One way to measure the level of basic subsistence rights is through the use of per 
capital gross domestic product and gross national product figures.  A popular measure of 
citizens’ enjoyment of subsistence rights in a given country is the Heston and Summers 
(1992) per capita Gross Domestic Product measure.  
However, critics rightfully charge that a raw statistic such as gross domestic 
product does not directly capture the degree to which basic human needs are actually met, 
since it does not measure the distribution of resources within a society (Morris 1978).  
Therefore, I will use a measure for subsistence rights that is derived from the Physical 
Quality of Life Index (PQLI), an indexed measure of the degree to which basic human 
needs are actually being met.  PQLI is one of a series of alternative measures that are 
designed to give a more accurate picture of the actual state of economic development in a 
country.  The PQLI consists of three components: 1) the number of infant deaths per 
1000 live births, 2) life expectancy at age one, and 3) the percentage of the adult 
population that is literate.  Each country is evaluated according to its fulfillment of these 
three basic needs criteria on a scale of 1 to 100.  The source for this index is Morris 
(1996).  
Security Rights.  The second set of basic human rights I will include in my 
analysis are “integrity of the person,” “physical integrity rights,” or “security rights.”  
The foundation for these rights is the fact that they are basic in the sense that without 
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them no person can live without being in fear of their personal well-being, safety, and 
dignity.  
Two types of data are available to researchers who wish to study human rights 
using an empirical, quantitative approach.  The first approach is known as the events-
based approach, in which a researcher codes all occurrences of human rights violations of 
a particular type (e.g., torture, murder, imprisonment) are summed for a particular time 
period (usually monthly or yearly) from newspaper or wire reports.  This summed total of 
events serves as a measure of repression.  While events-based approaches have gained a 
certain level of popularity (e.g., Davenport 1995; Barbieri and Davenport 1997), several 
criticisms of this approach have been registered in recent years (Stohl et al. 1986; Lopez 
and Stohl 1992; Milner 1999).  One criticism is that few reports of human rights abuses 
come from closed societies such as North Korea.  In other words, a country that does not 
allow access to the media will not score highly on an events-based repression measure 
because such abuses are not frequently reported in news sources such as Reuters.  This 
lack of reporting of abuses in relatively closed (or remote) countries will bias their human 
rights records substantially.  Second, there is clearly a Western bias toward the reporting 
of rights abuses, since most of the wire sources originate in the West.  This is not to say 
that there are no potential benefits to research based on event-based data.  Such data, 
especially when events are parsed from news sources using event count software, may 
contain fewer types of certain coding errors than do data coded by humans. 
For my analysis I will use measures of political and security rights that employ 
standards-based measures of the human rights situation in a given country.  The 
standards-based approach requires human coders to read reports on the human rights 
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situation in various countries, and to classify these countries according to predetermined 
criteria.  The advantage of the standards-based approach is that by allowing a degree of 
informed judgment on the part of coders, researchers are able to avoid the types of 
systematic bias observed in the events-based approach.  However, using a standards-
based approach means that human bias will be introduced into the data, reducing the 
reliability of the measure. 
The standards-based measure most applicable to comparative analysis of a large 
number of countries is the Political Terror Scale (PTS).  This is a five-point measure 
created by coding annually published country human rights reports.  To create the PTS 
measure, coders apply criteria originally developed by Gastil (1980) to information 
published by Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department (e.g., Amnesty 
International 1981; U.S. Department of State 1981).  Under the PTS coding scheme, one 
represents the lowest level of security rights violations and five represents the highest 
level (for examples of research using PTS, see Stohl and Carleton 1985; Gibney and 
Dalton 1996; Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe 1992; Gibney and Stohl 1988; Poe, Tate and 
Keith 1999).  Gastil’s five levels are: 
1)  “Countries [are] under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for 
their views, and torture is rare or exceptional…political murders are extremely 
rare.” 
 
2) “there is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beating are 
exceptional…political murder is rare.” 
 
3) “There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be 





4) "The practices of (level 3) are expanded to larger numbers.  Murders, 
disappearances are a common part of life…In spite of its generality, on this 
level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or 
ideas.”   
 
5) “The terrors of (level 4) have been expanded to the whole population…the 
leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with 
which they pursue personal or ideological goals.” (Gastil 1980, as quoted in 
Stohl and Carleton, 1985). 
 
Separate measures exist for the State Department and Amnesty International 
reports.  Although certain political biases may exist in the State Department measure 
(Innes 1992; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Vazquez, and Zanger 2001), the presence of an 
additional measure for the same concept can be useful for capturing more than one 
dimension of the same phenomenon.  The source of these measures is Gibney and Dalton 
(1996) and Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999).  I use the Amnesty International measure when 
available.  However, in cases where the Amnesty score is not available for a particular 
country and year, I use the State Department score instead.  This substitution appears to 
be an acceptable solution, as the mean Amnesty Score in my data set is 2.77 and the 
equivalent score for the State Department measure is 2.83 (the median score for each 
measure is 3).  For a more thorough discussion of the development of this measure and 
some of the problems associated with its employment, see Milner (1998). 
c. Control Variables 
A number of factors have been linked to lower levels of government provision of 
basic rights, particularly security rights, over the years.  For this reason, I will use 
multivariate models that include a number of “control” variables that represent alternative 
explanations for the level of respect for human rights.  
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Population.  A large population is expected to have a harmful effect on the 
provision of rights by regimes.  Since larger populations lead to a greater strain on 
resources, governments in highly populated countries may be more likely to repress their 
citizens in order to suppress the high demand for systemic outputs  (Henderson 1993; Poe 
and Tate 1994). The measure for a country’s population will be the log of its total natural 
population, which is available from the Penn World Tables.5  The logarithmic 
transformation is employed in order to overcome the skewed distribution of total 
population that would otherwise hamper the statistical assumptions.  To be consistent 
with previous studies, I hypothesize that the greater a country’s population, the lower the 
level of subsistence rights and the higher the level of personal integrity violations.  I use 
the log of the population variable in order to control for heteroskedasticity. 
Level of Economic Development.  The level of economic development is 
represented in the models by the level of per capita gross national product (GNP).  In 
keeping with the assumptions of the “baseline” models discussed above (Poe and Tate 
1994; Henderson 1991; also see Park 1987), economic development alleviates scarcity, 
which in turn reduces social strife and demands on the political system.  In turn, 
governments in countries with high levels of economic development are less likely to feel 
threatened by a lack of order, and will thus not be as likely to resort to repressive 
measures.  Per capita GNP figures are available from the Penn World Tables.  In 
accordance with previous research findings, higher levels of economic development are 
hypothesized to lead to higher levels of subsistence and lower levels of security rights 
                                                        
5 The Penn World Tables Mark 5.6 data set is used for population and per capita GNP figures ( 2000-
2001 Alan Heston and Robert Summers, Computing in the Humanities and Social Sciences, University of 
Toronto, www.chass.utoronto.ca). [For the rest of the chapter use Penn World Tables]. 
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violations.  I use the log of the per capita GNP variable in order to control for 
heteroskedasticity.   
Democracy.  It might be hypothesized that democratic regimes are more 
responsive to demands of their citizens, thus eliminating the motivation for groups or 
individuals to challenge the authority of the regime.  Poe and Tate (1994, 97) argue that 
democracy may provide an outlet for removing undesirable leaders before they become 
too threatening to the interests and basic human rights of the population.  The measure for 
democracy in this model will be the Polity III (Gurr 1972) index, a standards-based 
measure based on institutional characteristics of countries’ political systems.  The 
democracy index is an eleven-point measure of the level of conformity of political 
institutions to accepted democratic standards.  Zero represents the lowest level of 
democracy and ten represents the highest level.  In keeping with the findings of previous 
research, an increase in the level of democracy is hypothesized to lead to higher levels of 
subsistence and lower levels of security rights violations. 
Threat to Regime.  A new vein of research attempts to understand the relationship  
between political repression and the type of threat it faces from opposition groups.  Poe, 
Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001) hypothesize that regimes will feel more threatened when 
opposition groups become more active or powerful, and will be more likely to use state 
terror to stabilize their own power: 
By imprisoning, torturing, and executing persons in opposition to the 
government…a regime may instill fear in those who might otherwise 
oppose the government, stifling dissent, and therefore increasing the 




In order to capture the concept of threat, the authors create a variable with 
four categories of threat: 1) nonviolent protest, 2) nonviolent rebellion, 3) violent  
rebellion, and 4) civil war.6   This is a standards-based measure taken from three 
sources: the Europa Yearbook, the Political Handbook of the World, and the State 
Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  I will treat the data as 
a five point ordinal scale, with no protest being the lowest value and civil war 
being the highest.  In keeping with the authors, I hypothesize that the severity of 
threat to a regime from organized opposition groups may be reflected in a 
country’s human rights record.  Thus, higher levels of threat are hypothesized to 
lead to lower levels of subsistence and higher levels of security rights violations 
by regimes.  Data are provided by Poe et al. (2001).  
Leftist Regime.  Another variable that has been hypothesized to affect 
government respect for human rights is whether a regime is leftist or not.  Many, 
including former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, argue 
that these regimes are more repressive than right-wing “authoritarian” regimes.  
Both Mitchell and McCormick (1988) and Poe and Tate (1994) find limited 
                                                        
6 1. Nonviolent protest is described as threat in which “a mostly unarmed opposition regularly confronts the 
regime over one or more of it policies using demonstrations, riots, and other unconventional forms of 
political participation to express disagreement.” 
2. Nonviolent rebellion is described as a threat “in which an unarmed opposition pushes for significant 
change in the constitution or other political institutions through unconventional means not involving violent 
activities.  The difference between nonviolent rebellion and organized nonviolent protest is that in the 
former the goal of the opposition is more threatening because it pushes for broader institutional or 
constitutional change in contrast to the latter, in which the opposition seeks narrower, policy change.” 
3.Violent rebellion is described as a threat in which “there is a substantial organized movement which seeks 
to alter the governmental system, bringing about a significant change in the constitution or other political 
institutions, through armed attacks, including terrorist activities, guerrilla movements, and most attempted 
coups, but not civil war.” 
4. Civil war is described as a threat in which, in keeping with Singer and Small (1994) at least 1000 battle 
deaths result and in which a military government is involved, the national government is a participant in the 
conflict, and an effective resistance exists. See Poe et al. 2001 for more details. 
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support for the thesis that leftist regimes are more repressive than other regime 
types.  A leftist regime is defined as one that is governed by a socialist party and 
does not allow for effective non-socialist opposition.  Leftist regimes are 
hypothesized to be associated with higher levels of security rights violations. 
However, since leftist regimes are ostensibly guided by a socialist 
ideology that stresses economic equality and advocates a role for the state in 
providing for the welfare of its citizens, it appears to make sense to posit that 
leftist regimes will be more likely to ensure that a society’s basic human needs are 
provided for.  Therefore, leftist regimes are hypothesized to be associated with 
higher levels of subsistence rights.   Data are taken from Poe and Tate (1994). 
British History.  Mitchell and McCormick (1988) posit that the relatively 
decentralized and non-hierarchical nature of British colonial rule may lead 
governments of former British colonies to rule their citizens in a less authoritarian 
manner than do regimes in countries without a history of British rule.  Poe, Tate, 
and Keith (1999) find that countries with a history of British colonial rule are less 
likely to violate security rights, ceteris paribus.  Thus, countries with a British 
colonial history are hypothesized to have a lower level of subsistence and a higher 
level of security rights violations.  Data are taken from Poe and Tate (1994).   







3.4 Analytical Techniques 
a. Bivariate 
The first tool for analyzing the relationship between diversity and human rights is 
a bivariate analysis of the data.  A statistical correlation is a good initial indicator of the 
direction and strength of the relationship between a dependent and an independent 
variable.  The most common type of bivariate statistical test is the Pearson’s r test, which 
allows for hypothesis testing about whether a given relationship may have occurred by 
chance or not. 
Since the bivariate type of analysis above only tests for linear relationships, it is 
also possible to find out more about the relationship between diversity and the two 
measures of human rights using a visual examination of the data. By observing bivariate 
scatter plots, it is possible to search for nonlinear relationships in the data. It is also 
possible to look for necessary and sufficient conditions between the independent and 
dependent variables.   
b. Multivariate 
In addition, I will perform multivariate cross-sectional analyses of the data. The 
benefit of a multivariate statistical approach is that many competing explanations for 
variation in the level of respect for human rights can be evaluated in a single analysis.  
Thus, it may be possible to observe which factors do the best job of explaining the human 
rights record in a specific country, when taking into account competing influences.   
In addition to a standard single regression predicting security and subsistence 
rights, this analysis will attempt to isolate direct and indirect effects of diversity through 
the use of path analysis.  It is possible, then, to see the effects of ethnolinguistic and 
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religious diversity on both human rights measures, both through a direct effect as well as 
via the effects of other factors.  So in addition to the direction and relative impact of 
diversity, we can see how intervening variables affect the relationship as well.   
The path diagrams for these causal models are drawn out in the following two 
analysis chapters.  
3.5 Summary  
This chapter has attempted to outline the theoretical linkages between cultural 
diversity and respect for security and subsistence rights in the developing world.   
 An attempt was made to identify theoretical links between high levels of diversity 
and lower levels of subsistence rights in a given country.  Two links were identified. The 
first theoretical position essentially treats cultural groups as any other group, and holds 
that a greater number of groups placing demands on a regime will lead to a lower level of 
efficiency in provision of public goods.  This, in turn governments are less likely to 
provide for the right to subsistence, ceteris paribus. A second, related theoretical 
argument is that governments in diverse countries are more likely to feel pressure to 
appease politically important ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups in society by 
providing them with resources specifically dedicated toward that group—instead of 
expending resources in ways that might provide for societal needs in general, such as 
basic human needs.  Thus, higher levels of diversity are hypothesized to lead to lower 
levels of enjoyment of subsistence rights by the citizens in a given country, all other 
factors held constant. 
This chapter also presented a second set of theoretical arguments that attempt to 
link high levels of cultural diversity to higher levels of security rights violations.  The 
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first reason is that since diverse countries are linked with higher levels of political 
instability and less likely to be under rule of law, regimes may be more likely to resort to 
political terror simply because they are more likely to be concerned with political 
survival than with respecting the right to physical integrity of their country’s citizens.  
The second connection made between diversity and lack of respect for security rights is 
related to the level of threat to a regime’s stability presented by diverse regimes.  
Regimes in diverse societies may face more organized political opposition from the large 
number of ethnic and religious groups than would regimes that exist in a more 
homogenous cultural setting.  If leaders feel more threatened by political opposition, they 
may be more likely to respond with state terror than might otherwise be the case. 
Thus, higher levels of ethnolinguistic and religious diversity are hypothesized to 
lead to higher levels of security rights violations in a given country, all of other factors 
held constant. 
In addition to the theoretical links between diversity and regime respect for 
human rights, this chapter identified and provided operational definitions for several 
other variables that have been linked to rights performance, including wealth, population 
size, British colonial history, leftist regime ideology, democratic openness, and level of 
threat from opposition groups. The effects of the diversity variables will be empirically 
examined in the next two chapters.  Through the use of graphs, bivariate statistical 
techniques, multivariate regression techniques, and path analysis, I will test the 
hypothesis that ethnolinguistic and religious diversity are linked to security and 
subsistence rights.   
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The next chapter examines the effects of diversity on the first of the two types of 
rights: the right to subsistence.  
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CHAPTER 4  
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY  
ON ECONOMIC AND SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS 
 
Efforts to analyze the relationship between cultural heterogeneity and rights will 
be divided into two separate chapters.  This chapter will deal with the relationship 
between societal heterogeneity and those rights that are collectively termed economic and 
subsistence rights. Chapter 5 will examine the relationship between diversity and security 
rights. 
 The chapter will deal with the relationship between diversity (both ethnolinguistic 
and religious) and right to subsistence on two levels.  The first section will examine the 
relationship between heterogeneity and economic/subsistence rights through the use of 
bivariate analyses.  The second section will examine the interrelationship of these 
variables with other potential explanatory variables, and as such will constitute a set of 
multivariate analyses.  A final section will tie the analyses together, providing a detailed 
discussion of the substantive findings of the chapter. 
 Bivariate relationships are performed for both 1993 and 1983.  Multivariate 
analyses are performed using data for the year 1993.  See Appendix I for multivariate 
analyses using 1983 data. 
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4.1 Bivariate Analyses 
In order to understand relationships among various data, a good first step is to 
outline the bivariate relationships between independent and dependent variables. After a 
visual and statistical exploration of this most basic relationship, one can use multivariate 
analyses that can statistically control for alternative explanations for why certain bivariate 
relationships emerge (or do not emerge). 
a. Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Physical Quality of Life 
The Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) is the subsistence rights-related 
indicator to be examined in this chapter. Because this measure is concerned with factors 
such as health and education, as opposed to aggregate monetary totals, many would argue 
that PQLI more accurately captures the concepts inherent in the idea of subsistence rights 
than do per capita Gross National or Gross Domestic Product figures. 
An examination of the bivariate relationship between ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and physical quality of life reveals, at first glance, a rather strong 
negative link between the two phenomena [Table 4.1].  The Pearson’s r correlations for 
the global sample of developing nations for the years 1983 and 1993 are -.36 and -.38, 
respectively.  Both figures are statistically significant at the .05 level.  Interestingly, 
however, not a single region exhibited the same negative, statistically significant pattern.  
In fact, in only two regions, Africa and South America, is ethnolinguistic diversity 
negatively correlated with physical quality of life.  Furthermore, if Africa is dropped 
from the analysis, the Pearson’s r correlation for the global sample for 1993 rises from  
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-.38 to -.02.  Thus, based on statistical correlations alone, one would not be well advised 
to make any solid conclusion as to any relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and 
physical quality of life. 
Table 4.1  Pearson’s Correlations Between Ethnolinguistic  
       Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993. 
 
 r  N 
World (1993) -.38 *  106 
World (1983) -.36 * 103 
North America .27   16 
South America -.56  12 
Africa -.39   42 
Middle East/N. Africa .06  18 
Asia/Pacific .15  18 
    
* = significant at .05 level   
 
Moving on to the scatter plots of this relationship [Figure 4.1], a pattern emerges 
that suggests a high degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is almost a sufficient 
condition for a floor value (around .50) for a reasonably high PQLI score (close to .60). 
Only a five countries appear in the lower left hand quadrant of the scatter plot (the low 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization-low PQLI quadrant), while 19 countries with a high level 
of ethnolinguistic diversity (a fractionalization score of greater than .60) have a PQLI 
score of lower than 50.  Is it possible that a high degree of homogeneity militates against 
low levels of subsistence rights? 
There is not a clear answer to this question. If one looks at the world as a global 
sample, the answer may be ‘yes’.  However, of the 19 ‘diverse’ (fractionalization scores 
above .6) countries with PQLI scores below 50 (an arbitrary standard for a minimally 
acceptable physical quality of life), 17 of those countries are located in Africa.  An 
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examination of the same global scatter plot [Figure 4.2] with African nations excluded 
reveals no hint of any type of pattern or relationship in the data.  In addition, a scatter plot 
of the same data from 1983 (Africa included) reveals similar results [see Figure 4.3].  In 
other words, a cluster of diverse countries with low PQLI scores appears in the 
Figure 4.1  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic 













lower right quadrant of the graph, but the majority of these are African states.  Does this 
mean that for the world as a whole we should argue that some level of ethnolinguistic 
homogeneity is a necessary condition for an acceptable PQLI score?  If we do not view 
the African continent as a special case, this appears to be the case.   
Is there a noticeable difference between the data for the two time points? A 




























while the level of PQLI has increased for countries with both high and low levels of 
ethnolinguistic heterogeneity, the gap between the two types of countries does not change 
over the 10-year period.   
Figure 4.2  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic 














An examination of the cross tabulation of the bivariate relationship between 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization and Physical Quality of Life suggests the possibility that 
high levels of homogeneity may be a sufficient condition for high levels of subsistence 
rights.  Table 4.2 reveals that of the 54 countries with an ELF score of less than .60, only 
nine have a PQLI score that is lower than .60.  In fact, of the 18 countries that fall into the 
poorest category of PQLI (less than 45.00), only two, Yemen and Somalia [which are in 


























This is significant because the mean for the religious diversity variable is .54, meaning 
that 16 of the 18 countries that fall into the worst category of subsistence rights are more 
diverse than the average country. In contrast, of the 52 countries with ELF scores above 
.60, 33 (63 percent) suffer from a Physical Quality of Life Index score below 60.  The 
relationship is very clear from a bivariate perspective—citizens in countries with low and 
medium levels of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity are much more likely to enjoy a moderate 
or high level of subsistence than their highly diverse counterparts. 
Figure 4.3  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic 














Do regionally separated scatter plots of the relationship between ethnolinguistic 
diversity and physical quality of life reveal any additional information?  An examination 

























Table 4.2   Cross Tabulation of the Bivariate Relationship Between  
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993. 
 
Crosstabs. (For ELF Index, 1=0 to .20, 2=.21 to .40, 3=.41 to 60, 4=.61 to 80, 5=. 81 and higher) 
(For PQLI, 1= 0 to 45, 2= 45.01 to 60, 3=60.1 to 75, 4= 75.01 to 90) 
 
provide an answer to this question, as possible patterns among the data were detected. 
The Middle East [Figure 4.4] is an example of a region that does not reveal a pattern in 
the relationship between the two phenomena.  In fact, except for two outlying countries 
with very low PQLI scores (Afghanistan and Yemen), and one country with a somewhat 
higher score (Israel), all of the Middle Eastern countries are spread out across a very 
narrow range (from about 60 to the low 80s) on the PQLI measure, despite their wide 
range of diversity scores.  So in the case of the Middle East, no relationship is observable 
between ethnolinguistic diversity and PQLI. 
In contrast to the Middle East, Africa is the region that exhibits a strong bivariate 
negative bivariate relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and physical quality of 
life.  Does a visual examination of the scatter plot of this region reinforce this finding of a 
negative relationship?  A scatter plot of African countries [Figure 4.5] reveals that a vast 
cluster of the total number of countries lies in the lower left-hand (the very high  
1 1 11 5 18
.9% .9% 10.4% 4.7% 17.0%
3 3 1 8 9 24
2.8% 2.8% .9% 7.5% 8.5% 22.6%
8 6 5 3 3 25
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Figure 4.4  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization and PQLI Score  













diversity-very low PQLI) quadrant.  In the African case, there are no highly diverse 
countries with Physical Quality of Life Scores above 70.  The only three African 
countries to achieve a PQLI score of above 70 are Botswana, Mauritius, and the 
Seychelles, all of which have an ethnolinguistic fractionalization score of .48 or lower.  
The large cluster of diverse, poor countries means that in Africa there is not a clearly 
identifiable linear negative relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and 
physical quality of life. 
Thus, an analysis of the bivariate scatter plots of the relationship between 


























Figure 4.5  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and 












nature of some underlying relationship inherent in the data. Neither a conditional 
(necessary or sufficient) pattern, nor some other type of nonlinear pattern can be seen in 
the data.  What does arise from an analysis of this data is that, generally speaking, there is 
neither a strong relationship at the aggregate level nor within any individual continent 
when examining this bivariate relationship.  The exception is the large number of very 
diverse, very low-PQLI countries in the African continent. These countries stand out so 
much that perhaps they require some sort of separate type of analysis in order to 
determine whether the extremely low levels of enjoyment of subsistence rights by the 
citizens in these countries is in some way a result of their high level of diversity, or if it is 




























b. Religious Fractionalization and Physical Quality of Life 
The chapter now moves to an analysis of the bivariate relationship between 
religious diversity and physical quality of life.  As is the case with the previous analysis, 
the relationship does not necessarily appear to be the same across regions.  For a global 
sample of developing nations for the year 1993, the statistical relationship between 
religious fractionalization and PQLI is negative (r= -.22) and statistically significant at 
the .05 level [see Table 4.3].  The relationship is also negative when 1983 data are used, 
but is not quite as strong (r= -.14) and is not statistically significant.  Interestingly, 
although the global relationship is negative, only the Middle East/North Africa region (r= 
-.18) replicates this relationship at the regional level. The other regions produce positive 
relationships, two of which, North America (r= .43), and Asia (r= .48) are both rather 
sizable and statistically significant at the .05 level. In the other two regions, South 
America (r= .28) and Africa (r=.15), a positive relationship emerges, but is neither 
statistically significant at the .05 level nor (especially in the case of Africa) particularly 
strong. 
 
Table 4.3   Pearson’s Correlations Between Religious  
Fractionalization and PQLI Score, 1993. 
 
 r  N 
World (1993) -.22 * 105 
World (1983) -.14  103 
North America .43 *  16 
South America .28  12 
Africa .15  42 
Middle East/N. Africa -.18  18 
Asia .48 *  17 
    




This finding appears to be puzzling, since one would not expect a different 
relationship in the global data set than in its constituent parts.  In addition, the Middle 
East region (the only one in which the relationship was negative) consists of only 12 
countries in this study, which would appear to make it unlikely that the relationship found 
in this region would strongly impact the overall direction of the statistical relationship. 
What accounts for this seemingly odd finding?  The answer seems to lie in the 
fact that within regions countries tend to be clustered rather closely to one another, but 
that there is great variation in where those countries are clustered across regions.  An 
examination of the scatter plot of the relationship between religious diversity and PQLI 
scores for the year 1993 [Figure 4.6] reveals two notable sets of clusters, one in the upper  
 
Figure 4.6  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization  







































left hand corner of the graph (the low fractionalization-high PQLI quadrant), and one on 
the bottom right hand corner (the high fractionalization-low PQLI quadrant).  Figure 4.6 
also reveals that many more countries with religious fractionalization scores below .40 
have PQLI scores above 60 than below this figure.  Conversely, it appears that in 
countries with religious fractionalization scores below .40, there is not much difference 
between the number of countries with PQLI scores above and below 60.  The scatter plot 
of the relationship between fractionalization and PQLI  reveals no nonlinear pattern in the 
data. 
In fact, an inspection of Table 4.4 reveals that 32 (30.4 percent) of the 105 cases 
fall into the ‘low religious fractionalization-high PQLI’ category, defined by having a  
Table 4.4   Cross Tabulations of the Bivariate Relationship Between 
Religious Fractionalization and PQLI, 1993. 
 
5 3 4 6 18
4.8% 2.9% 3.8% 5.7% 17.1%
3 4 4 13 24
2.9% 3.8% 3.8% 12.4% 22.9%
14 2 1 7 24
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Crosstabs. (For REL Index, 1=0 to .20, 2=.21 to .40, 3=.41 to 60, 4=.61 and higher) 
(For PQLI, 1= 0 to 45, 2= 45.01 to 60, 3=60.1 to 75, 4= 75.01 to 90) 
religious fractionalization score of .20 or less and a PQLI score of greater than 60.  
Meanwhile, 19 cases (18.3 percent of the total) fall into the category of ‘high religious 
fractionalization-low PQLI (which is defined as a religious fractionalization score above  
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.60 and a PQLI score below .60).  So it appears as if some of the data have separated into 
these two distinct categories.  Moreover, the graph of the same relationship for the year 
1983 appears to be almost identical to the 1993 graph.  Does this separation hold across 
regions? 
When the sample is broken down into regions, it becomes apparent that the 
answer may be ‘no’.  In three regions—North America, South America, and the Middle 
East—countries tend to cluster in the aforementioned low fractionalization-high PQLI 
quadrant.  Interestingly, Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show that in the North American and South 
American cases, almost identical curvilinear forms can be observed, centering around the 
upper-left hand (high PQLI low religious fractionalization) quadrant.  What the 
substantive implications for this pattern might be is not clear. 
Figure 4.7  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization  




































In both North and South America, the countries with the worst physical quality of 
life tend to be the more diverse ones.  In North America, the six countries with religious 
diversity scores below .20 (Dominica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Mexico) all are among the seven poorest countries in the region.  
Likewise, in South America, three of the four countries with the worst PQLI have 
religious diversity scores of .14 or less (they include Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia).  Brazil 
and Haiti are the two cases in North and South America that are somewhat more diverse 
but still have extremely poor levels of subsistence rights.  
Figure 4.8  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization and 












In the Africa-only scatter plot [Figure 4.9], on the other hand, the bulk of 
countries fall into the high fractionalization-low PQLI part of the graph. At the extremes 























are very different in terms of their level of religious diversity, as the former scores highly 
on the religious fractionalization index and the latter has a rather low score.  In any case, 
both cases are not typical of African countries, since they are island nations.  Among the 
countries with the worst PQLI scores there is also a broad range of religious diversity 
represented.  There is enough of a U-shape in the graph to suggest that perhaps there is 
some curvilinear effect in the African case, where countries with high and low levels of 
religious diversity tend to have higher levels of subsistence than those countries that fall 
into the middle range of diversity. 
Figure 4.9  Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization  










































Aside from this tendency for countries to cluster within regions, no linear or 
nonlinear relationship can be observed in global scatter plots of the relationship between 
religious diversity and physical quality of life for the years 1983 or 1993.  Thus, although 
some type of relationship may exist at the aggregate level, it cannot be replicated within 
continents. Thus Africa, for instance, weights the overall relationship in a negative 
direction despite the fact that the relationship in this region is actually positive.  In order 
to make some sort of pronouncement that religious diversity is conducive to higher levels 
of subsistence rights, one would first need to explain why such a relationship does not 
generally exist at the regional level. A more important factor may be what continent a 
country lies in.  
4.2 Multivariate Analyses 
a.  Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Subsistence Rights 
The first part of this chapter investigated the bivariate relationship between 
cultural heterogeneity and provision of subsistence rights. The current section will 
attempt to better understand this relationship through the use of  multivariate analytical 
techniques. 
A beginning step for a multivariate analysis is to create a model that incorporates 
many alternative explanations for why a phenomenon occurs into a single equation.  For 
guidance, this paper will use a similar analysis performed by Poe and Tate (1994) and 
Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999).  While that model attempted to explain variation in security 
rights performance, it is possible to create the same type of model to predict the level of 
subsistence rights enjoyed by a given country's citizens.   A noticeable omission in this 
explanatory model is the variable for British colonial influence.  It is not included 
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because of a lack of theoretical or empirical grounds for a relationship between a British 
colonial history and the level of subsistence rights.1   
 The model will be estimated as: 
PQLI = α + (log)â1PCGNP + â2DEMOC3 + â3THREAT + (log)â4POP + â5LEFT 
+ â6WBELF + ε 
Where: 
PQLI= Physical Quality of Life Index Score.  
 
PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product. 
THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the regime. Ranges from ‘1’ (nonviolent  




LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type. 
 
WBELF= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index score. 
 
See table 4.5 below for a description of each variable in the model, along with the 
anticipated effects on the level of subsistence.  For more discussion of the variables, 
including the data sources and anticipated effects, please refer to the description of the 
variables in Chapter Three. 
Table 4.6 presents the results of a multivariate model that predicts physical 
quality of life.  When examining the model as a whole, the adjusted R-Squared is .60, 
which means that approximately 60 percent of the variation in Physical Quality of Life 
can be explained by this model.  By comparison, when the same model is run without  
                                                        
1 However, note that British colonial history will be included in the model for security rights that will be 
developed in Chapter V. 
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Table 4.5    Description of Variables in a Predictive Model of     
Subsistence Rights (Ethnolinguistic                    
Fractionalization Included), 1993. 
 
Variable Description  Effect Source   
PCGNP Log of Gross National Product, Positive Penn World Tables 
  Lagged one Time Period    
DEMOC3 Polity 3 Democracy Score Positive Polity III  
POP Log of Population  Negative Penn World Tables 
  Lagged one Time Period    
LEFT Presence of Leftist Government Positive Poe, Tate, Keith (1999) 
THREAT Threat to Regime,  Negative Poe, Tate, Keith,  
 Lagged one Time Period  and Lanier (2001) 
WBELF World Bank Ethnolinguistic  Negative Annett (2000) 
  Fractionalization Score    
 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the adjusted R-Squared only drops to .58 (from .60), 
which suggests that the overall direct impact of ethnolinguistic diversity on subsistence 
rights is not very large.  An F-Test rejects the null hypothesis that the model’s 
coefficients are zero, which rejects the possibility that the model’s effects occurred due to 
chance.  A Klein tests reveals no hint of multicollinearity in the model.  
 
Table 4.6    Multivariate Regression of Subsistence Rights, 1993.  
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
(Log) Per Capita GNP/$1000 (lagged) 9.34 1.23 .000 .64 * 
Democracy 1.20 .30 .000 .28 * 
Threat (lagged)  -.78 .93 .401 -.07   
(Log)Population (lagged)  1.99 .86 .024 .18 * 
Leftist Regime 10.97 5.12 .035 .16 * 
Ethnolinguistic -11.35 5.20 .032 -.17 * 
Fractionalization      
       
* = p<.05 (one-tailed)   Adjusted R-Squared = .60   
N=86     Root Mean Square Error= 10.882 
F (6, 79) = 22.26    Prob > F = 0.0000  
Moving to an analysis of the individual regressors, the first variable included in 
the model is wealth, as measured by per capita GNP.  As hypothesized, it is positively 
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correlated with high levels of subsistence rights, ceteris paribus (all other factors held 
constant).  The coefficient for per capita GNP is statistically significant at the .05 level. 
The second independent variable is level of democratic openness, as measured by 
the Polity III democracy score.  As hypothesized, democracy is positively correlated with 
higher levels of PQLI when all other model variables are held at their statistical means.  
The coefficient is statistically significant. 
Third, the level of threat faced by a regime is not correlated either positively or 
negatively with physical quality of life.  The hypothesis that higher levels of 
ethnolinguistic diversity are associated with lower levels of subsistence is not confirmed 
by the data.  
Population has a somewhat surprising effect, as it is positively associated with 
high levels of PQLI, ceteris paribus.  The coefficient for population is statistically 
significant at the .05 level. This relationship does not occur in the hypothesized direction, 
indicating that large populations may not be incompatible with high levels of 
achievement when all other variables are taken into consideration. 
The leftist regime variable had the expected effect, as countries with leftist 
governments were correlated with higher levels of subsistence rights, ceteris paribus.  
The coefficient for leftist regime type is statistically significant at the .05 level.  Leftist 
regime type, then, warrants inclusion in a multivariate causal model of subsistence rights. 
Finally, the effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization was negative and 
statistically significant.  In other words, higher levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity are 
associated with lower levels of enjoyment of subsistence rights by a country’s citizens.  
This effect is in the hypothesized direction.  
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To briefly summarize the model of subsistence rights, Table 4.6 reveals that all of 
the variables except level of threat to the regime from organized opposition have a 
statistically significant impact on Physical Quality of Life.  Wealth, democratic openness, 
population size, and leftist regime type were all positively correlated with high levels of 
Physical Quality of Life, while ethnolinguistic diversity was the only variable that had a 
statistically significant negative effect. 
The relative impact of ethnolinguistic diversity (beta = -.17), as measured by the 
World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index, was about the same as the effect of 
population (beta=.18) and leftist regime type (beta = .16), and slightly over one-half that 
of democracy (beta = .28).  However, the driving factor in the model is clearly the level 
of wealth in a country. With a statistically significant beta coefficient of .64, the relative 
impact of per capita Gross National Product is more than twice that of any other variable 
in the model. 
Thus, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with lower levels of 
subsistence rights when all other variables in the model are held constant.  Holding other 
potential explanatory factors at their statistical means, countries that are more diverse are 
less likely to provide a high level of subsistence to their citizens.  This might lead a 
researcher to provisionally conclude that ethnolinguistic diversity should be included 
among the list of factors that negatively affect subsistence rights.   
While this initial finding is interesting, it remains possible that a path analytical 
approach may reveal more about the relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables.  This is done by creating a causal model that tests explicit linkages between 
causal factors. One useful first step in this direction is to drop variables in the original 
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multivariate model that were not found to be statistically significant.  In this case, the 
domestic threat variable is not statistically significant. This variable will be dropped, and 
the equation will be re-estimated. 
 
Table 4.7    Multivariate Regression of Physical Quality of Life     
                    (Domestic Threat Variable Omitted), 1993. 
 
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
(Log) Per Capita GNP/$1000 (lagged) 9.71 1.15 .000 .67 * 
Democracy 1.95 .30 .000 .28 * 
(Log) Population (lagged)  1.74 .81 .034 .16 * 
Leftist Regime  11.70 5.03 .023 .17 * 
Ethnolinguistic -11.24 5.19 .033 -.17 * 
Fractionalization      
* = p<.05 (one-tailed)   Adjusted R-Squared = .60 
N=86     Root Mean Square Error= 10.863 
F (5, 80) = 26.66    Prob > F = 0.0000 
When the domestic threat variable is dropped, very little changes in the model.  
One can see in Table 4.7 that the coefficients do not change very much, as the goodness 
of fit improves only slightly, as the adjusted R-Squared remains unchanged at .60 and the 
root mean squared error decreases by only a tiny amount.  
Figure 4.10 is a path diagram of the causal linkages between the variables in the 
multivariate model of subsistence rights.  It specifies linkages between the variables in 
the model, along with a specified direction of each relationship.  In all cases, the variables 
in the regression model above are hypothesized to have the same effects in this causal 
model.  However, indirect linkages are also specified in order to capture the indirect 
effects of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on security rights.  This causal model, then, is 
a way to better specify the relationship between diversity and security rights by 




In the causal model, three variables—ethnolinguistic fractionalization, population, 
and leftist regime—can be considered to be exogenous. That is, none of the other model 
variables can be hypothesized to have an effect on them directly.   While one of these 
three exogenous variables, leftist regime, can not be hypothesized to have an effect on 
any other variables in the model, it is plausible that the other two, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and population, may affect two of the other model variables—wealth 
and democracy.  Thus, in addition to having a direct effect on security rights, 
ethnolinguistic diversity may indirectly affect security rights through its effect on these 
other two variables.  In keeping with the theoretical treatment above that links diversity 
to inferior social outcomes, ethnolinguistic diversity is hypothesized to lower the level of 
wealth and democracy.  To be consistent with the generally negative theoretical work and 
empirical research, population size is also hypothesized to lead to lower levels of wealth 
and democracy. 
This causal model can be estimated by working backwards. Initially, subsistence 
rights is the dependent variable, and all of the other model variables are considered to be 
independent.  The two model variables that are considered to be endogenous to 
population size and ethnolinguistic fractionalization—per capita GNP and democracy—
are treated as dependent variables in auxiliary regressions.  The direction and relative 
strength of each of the relationship can be obtained from the beta weights in each 
regression. Following Tan (1998), only the links that are statistically significant at the .10 
level (one-tailed) will be drawn in the estimated model.  It will be this model that will 




Figure 4.10   Causal Model of Subsistence Rights  
(Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  
Included), 1993. 
 
Below, Tables 4.8 and 4.9 are the remaining equations that must be estimated in 
order to derive the indirect effects for a causal model of subsistence rights that uses 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization as one of the explanatory variables. Table 4.8 estimates 
the effects of population and ethnolinguistic fractionalization on per capita GNP.  Table 
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Table 4.8    Regression of Per Capita GNP, 1993.   
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Population   -440.04 189.30 .022 -.23 * 
Ethnolinguistic -2123.93 1401.76 .133 -.15 * 
Fractionalization      
* = p<.10 (one-tailed)    N=103 
 
Table 4.9    Regression of Democracy, 1993. 
  
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Population   -.15 .29 .619 -.06  
Ethnolinguistic -1.46 1.80 .418 -.09  
Fractionalization      
* = p<.10 (one-tailed)    N=87 
 
Figure 4.11 is the fully estimated causal model that shows both the direct and 
indirect effects of the model variables on physical quality of life.  For instance, 
ethnolinguistic diversity has a direct negative effect (beta= -.17) on physical quality of 
life.  However, it also has an indirect effect on physical quality of life because higher 
levels of diversity correspond to lower levels of per capita G.N.P., which in turn is found 
to be associated with a higher PQLI score.  To calculate this indirect effect, it is necessary 
simply to multiply the coefficient between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and per capita 
GNP      (-.15) with the coefficient that links per capita GNP to physical quality of life 
(.67).  The product of these two coefficients is -.10, which is the indirect effect of 
diversity on physical quality of life.  If we sum the beta weights of the direct (-.17) and 
indirect (-.10), we find that the total effect is -.27.   
Table 4.10 reveals the direction and relative impact of each of the factors in the 
PQLI model.  The effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on Physical Quality of Life is 
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Figure 4.11   Causal Model of Subsistence Rights (Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization Included), 1993. 
 
negative (beta = -.27), when taking into account its impact through the rest of the 
variables in the model.  The impact of ethnolinguistic diversity can be broken down into 
direct and indirect effects.  The direct effect (beta = -.17) is somewhat larger than the 
indirect effect (beta = -.10) that occurs via lowered per capita GNP due to 
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Table 4.10     Direct and Indirect Effects of Model  
          Variables on Subsistence Rights, 1993.  
      
  Direct Indirect  Total 
Per Capita GNP/$1000 (log) .67 N/A  .67 
Democracy .28 N/A  .28 
Population (log)  .16 -.15 (via GNP) .01 
Leftist regime .17 N/A  .17 
Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization 
-.17 -.10 (via GNP) -.27 
     
 
Notably, all of the other variables have a positive effect on PQLI.  The absolute 
value of the effect of wealth (beta=.67) is about two and one-half times that of the 
magnitude of ethnolinguistic diversity.  The total effect of democracy (.28) is of about the 
same magnitude as that of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, but occurs in the opposite 
direction.  The magnitudes of the effects of leftist regime type (.17) and population (.01) 
are substantially smaller than that of ethnolingustic diversity. 
Thus, in a multivariate causal model that includes both direct and indirect effects, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization has negative impact on subsistence rights.  The effect is 
exacerbated by the indirect effect via a reduction in wealth, which in turn leads to lower 
levels of subsistence. 
b. Religious Fractionalization and Subsistence Rights 
What additional information can we learn about the relationship between religious 
fractionalization and subsistence rights using multivariate analytical techniques?  In order 
to answer this question, a model of security rights violations with religious 





PQLI = α + (log)â1PCGNP + â2DEMOC3 + â3THREAT + (log)â4POP + â5LEFT  
+ â6WBREL + ε 
Where: 
PQLI= Physical Quality of Life Index Score.  
 
PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product. 
THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the regime. Ranges from ‘1’ (nonviolent 




LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type. 
 
WBREL= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index score. 
 
 
See table 4.11 below for a description of each variable in the model.  For more 
discussion of the variables, including the data sources and anticipated effects, please refer 
to the description of the variables in Chapter Three. 
Table 4.11    Description of Variables in a Predictive Model of  
Subsistence Rights (Including Religious 
Fractionalization), 1993. 
 
    Anticipated  Data    
Variable Description  Effect Source   
PCGNP Log of Gross National Product, Positive Penn World Tables 
  Lagged one Time Period    
DEMOC3 Polity 3 Democracy Score Positive Polity III  
POP Log of Population  Negative Penn World Tables 
  Lagged one Time Period    
LEFT Presence of Leftist Government Positive Poe, Tate, Keith (1999) 
THREAT Threat to Regime,  Negative Poe, Tate, Keith,  
 Lagged one Time Period  and Lanier (2001) 
WBREL World Bank 
Religious 
 Negative Annett (2000) 




Table 4.12 presents the results of a regression predicting physical quality of life 
that includes religious rather than ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  The adjusted R-
Squared measure of goodness of fit shows that the model can explain about 58 percent of 
the variation in the Physical Quality of Life measure.  The goodness-of-fit statistics in 
this model are slightly worse than in the model for ethnolinguistic fractionalization above 
(see Table 4.6), as the R-Squared decreases from .60 to .58, and the mean squared error is 
slightly higher.  The model as a whole is statistically significant, as indicated by the joint 
F-test statistic.   
 
Table 4.12    Multivariate Regression of Subsistence Rights, 1993.  
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
(Log) Per Capita GNP/$1000 (lagged) 10.36 1.28 .000 .71 * 
Democracy 1.22 .32 .000 .29 * 
Threat (lagged)  -.71 .97 .464 -.06   
(Log)Population (lagged)  1.67 .88 .062 .15 * 
Leftist Regime 12.07 5.24 .024 .15 * 
Religious .50 5.10 .922 .01  
Fractionalization      
       
* = p<.05 (one-tailed)   Adjusted R-Squared = .58   
N=86     Root Mean Square Error= 11.205 
F (6, 79) = 20.25    Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
All of the control variables except threat (which is not statistically significant), 
and population size (which has a statistically significant positive effect) have effects that 
are in the expected direction and statistically significant.  Most notably as regards this 
research effort, however, the model finds that religious fractionalization does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the PQLI variable.  In fact, it has a tiny beta coefficient 
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(.01), and does not even come remotely close to being statistically significant.2  The 
direct effect of religious fractionalization does not appear to have much, if any of a direct 
effect on the PQLI score.  This is further borne out by the fact that when religious 
diversity is dropped from the model, the adjusted R-Squared does not improve at all, and 
the mean squared error only drops by a tiny amount (regression not shown).  
At this point, one might reasonably conclude that the level of religious diversity in 
a country does not appear to have a meaningful impact on the level of subsistence rights.  
After all, it does not have a sizable direct effect in a multivariate model.  However, since 
religious fractionalization is the variable of interest here, it is desirable to know as much 
as possible about its effects in a multivariate context. It may be sensible to take a brief 
look at how religious fractionalization plays out even though it does not have a direct 
effect on subsistence rights.  Religious diversity is included as a variable in a multivariate 
causal model in order to test for its indirect effect on security rights.  The first step is to 
drop the threat to regime variable, because it is also not statistically significant in the 
original model. 
Figure 4.12 is a fully estimated model of subsistence rights after the domestic 
threat variable is removed.  This regression is not shown. The supplementary regressions 
for Per Capita G.N.P. and Democracy, which are needed in order to calculate the indirect 
effects of religious fractionalization, are also not displayed.  The model reveals that 
religious fractionalization does indeed appear to affect physical quality of life, although  
                                                        
2 Interestingly, if per capita G.N.P. is not logged in the model, religious fractionalization has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on PQLI.  This effect is in the hypothesized direction.  However, in order to 
control for the possibility of unit-related heteroskedasticity, it appears to be wise to log the per capita 
G.N.P. variable.   
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Figure 4.12   Causal Model of Subsistence Rights (Religious 
Fractionalization Included), 1993. 
 
 
indirectly.  It does so in two ways. First, by negatively affecting the level of per capita 
Gross National Product, it leads indirectly to lower subsistence rights.  Second, higher 
levels of religious fractionalization lead to lower levels of democracy, which also in turn 
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Table 4.13 summarizes the direct and indirect effects of the model variables.   
Again, the variable with the biggest relative impact is wealth, which has an effect 
(beta=.74) that is more than two and one-half times more than that of any other variable.  
This effect is in the expected direction, meaning that wealth and high levels of 
subsistence are highly correlated with one another.  Democracy, population and regime 
type also have effects in the hypothesized direction.   
 
Table 4.13     Direct and Indirect Effects of Model 
 
          Variables on Subsistence Rights, 1993.  
      
  Direct Indirect  Total 
Per Capita GNP/$1000 (log) .74 N/A  .74 
Democracy .29 N/A  .29 
Leftist Regime  .19 N/A  .19 
Population (log)  .13 -.20 (via GNP) -.07 
Religious --- -.16 (via GNP)  
Fractionalization  -.05 (via democ.) -.21 
 
The variable of primary interest, religious fractionalization, has negative indirect 
effects that sum to a beta weight of -.21.  This effect is somewhat smaller than that of 
democracy, and only slightly larger than that of leftist regime type.  Again, there is no 
direct effect of religious diversity on subsistence rights.  Rather, its effects come 
indirectly because it is associated with lower levels of wealth and democracy.  The 
indirect effect of religious diversity, then, is to lower the levels of subsistence rights by 
lowering the level of two variables that are associated with higher levels of subsistence 
rights.  The indirect effects of religious fractionalization on the dependent variable 
through lowering GDP is -.16, more than three times larger in absolute value than the 
impact through democracy (-.05). When looking at the total impact of religious 
fractionalization in a causal model that includes both direct and indirect effects, its 
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relative effect is far smaller than that of wealth, and somewhat smaller than that of level 
of democracy. But its effect is slightly higher than that of leftist regime type, and three 
times that of population.  When one takes into account the overall effect of religious 
diversity, its total impact is similar to that of ethnolinguistic diversity in Table 4.10 
above.   
In short, religious diversity appears to exhibit a downward effect on the level of 
subsistence rights, but these effects are filtered through two other variables---wealth and 
democratic openness.  A standard regression does not identify a meaningful effect of 
religious diversity, but this path analytical model suggests that researchers need to 
consider religious diversity as an explanatory variable in an attempt to predict subsistence 
rights in a given country.    
 
4.3 Summary of Results 
The relationship between cultural heterogeneity in a country and the level of 
subsistence enjoyed by its citizens is largely unexplored. Aside from rough statistical 
analyses, there has been little empirical work on this topic in the social sciences.  The 
analyses of this chapter have produced a number of interesting, albeit preliminary, 
research findings: 
 First, a simple bivariate analysis of a global sample of developing nations in the 
years 1983 and 1993 reveals that higher levels of both ethnolinguistic and religious 
diversity in a country are associated with lower enjoyment of the right to subsistence, as 
measured by the Physical Quality of Life Index.  This negative relationship is found to be 
slightly stronger for ethnolinguistic diversity than for religious diversity.  Why this might 
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be the case is a subject of possible future research.  One possible explanation is that there 
is more variation in the ethnolinguistic measure than in the religious one.  In other words, 
the statistical relationship may be stronger in the case of ethnolinguistic diversity because 
it has a greater range of values than does religious diversity.  In addition, a visual 
examination of the relationships between both types of diversity and PQLI reveals no 
evidence of any conditional (i.e., necessary or sufficient) relationship between diversity 
and physical quality of life. 
 A second notable finding of the analyses in this chapter is that the effects of 
diversity on subsistence rights appear to vary quite widely across different regions of the 
world.  In the case of Africa, most of the countries fall into the high diversity-low PQLI 
quadrant of a scatter plot of the bivariate relationship.  In the Middle East/North Africa 
and Asian regions, no relationship of any type emerged in the data.  Bivariate scatter 
plots of the relationship between religious fractionalization and PQLI in 1993 are 
remarkably similar in the North and South American cases. However, they bear little 
resemblance to each other when ethnolinguistic fractionalization is used as the measure 
of diversity. In short, it is difficult to detect common patterns in the relationship between 
diversity and PQLI in bivariate scatter plots of the different regions can detect few 
common patterns across regions.  
Third, a multivariate analysis based on a global sample of developing nations in 
1993 strengthens the bivariate finding that ethnolinguistic diversity is associated with 
lower levels of PQLI.  When included as an explanatory variable with a series of other 
variables, ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a net effect that is about as strong as that 
of population and leftist regime type, though it is weaker than the effects of wealth and 
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democracy, as measured by beta weights.  In a causal model that captures both direct and 
indirect effects, ethnolinguistic diversity is still found to negatively impact physical 
quality of life, although its net effect remains weaker than that of wealth and level of 
democracy.  The negative direct effect is augmented by the indirect effect it has on PQLI 
via its negative impact on the level of per capita GNP.  Essentially, the other variables in 
the multivariate causal had the hypothesized effects.  
 Fourth, using data from 1993, religious diversity is also found to have a 
statistically significant negative effect when included in a multivariate model with other 
variables hypothesized to affect physical quality of life.  Notably, in contrast to the effect 
of ethnolinguistic diversity, the effect of religious fractionalization does not have a direct 
statistically significant effect on subsistence rights.  In fact, wealth, democracy, and threat 
to regime all have a higher level of impact on the PQLI than does religious diversity.  
This is because of the sizable indirect effects of religious diversity—it leads to lower 
PQLI due to the fact that it lowers wealth and level of democracy.  Thus, the total effects 
of religious and ethnolinguistic diversity are found to be relatively similar in the final 
analysis. The direct impact of other model variables on PQLI is in the predicted direction.  
Thus, ceteris paribus, it is possible to say that this chapter supports the contention that 
religious diversity leads to lower levels of subsistence. 
In short, both bivariate (using 1983 and 1993 data) and multivariate analyses 
(using 1993 data) lend evidence to the hypothesis that cultural diversity is somehow 
related to lower physical quality of life within a given country.  While the reasons for this 
harmful impact are surely the subject of future research, this chapter hints that one 
possible reason for this relationship is that more diverse countries tend to be poorer. In 
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CHAPTER 5  
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL  
DIVERSITY ON SECURITY RIGHTS 
 
This chapter will examine the relationship between cultural diversity and its 
effects on personal integrity or security rights.  As was the case in the previous chapter, it 
will examine the effects of both ethnolinguistic and religious diversity.  The first section 
will present analyses of the bivariate relationship between diversity and security rights, 
including both statistical correlations and scatter plots.  The second section will include 
multivariate analyses that include ethnolinguistic and religious diversity as explanatory 
factors, along with several competing factors that are purported to be related to personal 
integrity abuse in some manner.  The chapter will conclude with a summary discussion of 
the findings. 
 Analyses are performed using the Amnesty International Political Terror Scale 
measure for the years 1983 and 1993.  Consult Appendix I for results obtained when 
using the State Department data.  
 
5.1  Bivariate Analyses 
 
 
 In order to understand how cultural diversity and security rights interact, a 
bivariate analysis is a good starting point in which to analyze the relationship.  A 
subsequent section will analyze the relationship in a more complex, multivariate context.  
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a. Ethnolinguistic Diversity and Security Rights 
 The first bivariate relationship to be examined is the one between ethnolinguistic 
diversity and the provision of security rights.  Table 5.1 reveals that the Pearson’s r 
correlation between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations for the year 
1993 is .22 and statistically significant.  In other words, for the global sample of 105 
developing nations, an increase in the level of diversity corresponds to a higher level of 
security rights violations.   The relationship is only slightly weaker for the same 
relationship in 1983, at .20.   The moderate strength of this relationship is generally borne 
out when the same bivariate correlations are calculated at the regional level.  In all but 
one region, North America, ethnolinguistic diversity is positively correlated with security 
rights violations.  However, the relationship is only statistically significant in the case of 
the Asia and Pacific region.  In a test of the impacts of omitted regions on the overall 
effect, the removal of either Africa or Asia from the sample causes the relationship 
between ethnolinguistic diversity and personal integrity violations to lose statistical  
 
Table 5.1 Pearson’s Correlations Between Ethnolinguistic  
Fractionalization and Security Rights  
Violations, 1993. 
 
  r  N 
 North America -.16  16 
 South America .36  12 
 Africa .18  42 
 Middle East/N. Africa .01  18 
 Asia/Pacific .49 * 18 
 World (1993) .22 * 106 
 World (1983) .20 * 105 
     





significance.  The rather low number of countries in the global sample might help to  
explain why statistical significance is so difficult to achieve in an analysis of ethnic 
fractionalization and security rights. 
Because the Pearson’s r correlation assumes that both variables are continuous, it 
may be wise to include a measure of strength of the bivariate relationship that are 
designed for when one of the variables is ordinal in nature (in this case, the Amnesty 
International score).  The appropriate measures in this situation are Kendall’s tau-b and 
Spearman’s rho.  The strength of the relationship found by these measures is relatively 
similar to what was found using a Pearson's r correlation.  The correlation between 
ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations using the tau-b correlation is 
slightly lower than the Pearson’s r statistic, at .18, while the correlation using Spearman’s 
rho is .24, which is slightly higher than the Pearson’s r coefficient.   Both coefficients are 
statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Moving to a visual inspection of the bivariate relationship [See Figure 5.1], a 
scatter plot for the 1993 data reveals that there are relatively few countries that fall into 
the upper-left and lower-right corners of the graph. This means that there is an absence of 
countries with very high levels of homogeneity that fall into the highest category of 
violations, as well as a lack of countries with very high ethnolinguistic diversity that fall 
into the lowest category.  Beyond this finding, there is little to notice about the pattern of 
countries that emerges, except that countries generally fall into almost every part of the 
graph.  In other words, there is no evidence of any clear linear or nonlinear pattern in the 




Figure 5.1 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic 



























By comparison, an analysis of the scatter plots for the same relationship for the 
year 1983 [Figure 5.2] reveals a similar lack of a clear pattern in the data.  Certainly, as is 
the case with 1993, there is a clear lack of countries with low levels of diversity and high 
security rights violations.  Considering the fact that only five of the 104 nations in the 
bivariate analysis had the highest level of violations (i.e., a score of 5), one should not 
draw any strong conclusions from this finding. 
Moving to cross tabulations of the relationship, Table 5.2 divides the sample of 
countries into five parts, based on their level of ethnolinguistic diversity.  A cross-
tabulation reveals that no countries that experience the highest level of violations have an 































Figure 5.2 Bivariate Scatter Plots of Ethnolinguistic  





























Table 5.2 Cross Tabulation of the Bivariate Relationship Between 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights  
Violations, 1993. 
 
Values for Table:  For ELF, 1=0 to .20, 2=.21 to .40, 3=.41 to 60, 4=.61 to 80, 5=.81 to .99 
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with a fractionalization score above .80 that fall into the best (lowest) category of 
violations.  Aside from this finding, countries appear across the range of possible values, 
with no clear pattern.  The highest concentration of countries observable in the table is in 
those countries with ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores from .60 to .99 and Amnesty 
scores of 2 or 3.  In these four cells lie 29.2 percent of all of the countries, signifying a 
large cluster of countries in the relatively diverse-fairly good security rights category. 
Thus, no strong findings emerge from a bivariate analysis of the relationship between 
ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations.  One notable pattern in the data is 
that ethnically and linguistically homogeneous countries do not commonly have the worst 
security rights scores.  The overall statistical relationship is a weak positive relationship 
between security rights violations and ethnolinguistic diversity.  
 As with subsistence rights, one can observe no common pattern in the scatter plots 
of this relationship when broken down by region.  One example of a clear concentration 
of countries within a particular level of diversity and level of respect for security rights 
occurs in the case of Africa. Figure 5.3 displays the relationship between ethnolinguistic 
diversity and security rights violations for the African region.  In Africa a high 
concentration of countries fall into the area of the graph where ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is above .70 and the Amnesty score is two or three.  In fact, 20 of the 42 
African countries have both Amnesty scores of two or three and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization scores above .60.  
However, one cannot make any strong conclusions regarding the relationship 
between ethnolinguistic diversity and a regime’s propensity to violate the rights of its 
citizens based solely on a visual observation of the bivariate relationship. To properly  
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Figure 5.3. Bivariate Scatter Plot of Ethnolinguistic 
Fractionalization and Security Rights  














investigate this relationship, a multivariate analysis that can incorporate statistical 
controls will be required. 
b. Religious Diversity and Security Rights 
The bivariate relationship between religious diversity and security rights in 1993 
reveals a somewhat different statistical relationship than when ethnolinguistic diversity is 
examined.  Table 5.3 shows that the Pearson’s r correlation is very weak at -.01, a figure 
that is nowhere close to achieving statistical significance. Thus, unlike the relationship 
between ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights, a bivariate analysis of the 































type of linear relationship between these two phenomena.  When 1983 data are used, the 
magnitude of the relationship is slightly larger and negative (-.11), although this 
relationship is still not statistically significant at the .05 level.   
When one breaks down this relationship by region, one can observe a great range 
of correlations, from -.48 (North America) at one extreme to the Middle East (.33) at the 
other.  This range of scores seems to indicate that some further type of analysis by region 
may reveal more regarding the regional disparities.  Why does religious diversity appear 
to reduce security rights violations in North and South America, and to a lesser degree 
Asia, while at the same time appearing to exacerbate the problem in Africa and the 
Middle East?  Although the direction of the relationship varies by region, it is not 
possible to make strong inferences from this finding. Only in the case of North America 
is the relationship between religious diversity and security rights found to be statistically 
significant. This may well be related to the small sample sizes of these regional analyses.  
 
Table 5.3 Pearson’s Correlations Between Religious  
Fractionalization and Security Rights  
Violations, 1993. 
 
 r  N 
North America -.48 * 16 
South America -.46  12 
Africa .15  42 
Middle East/N. Africa .33  18 
Asia/Pacific -.29   17 
World (1993)  -.01   105 
World (1983) -.11   104 
    
* = significant at .05 level   
  
In order to test the influence of each region on the overall effect, each region in 
turn was removed from the global analysis.  When North America, South America, and 
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Asia were removed from the analysis, the correlation for the rest of the global sample 
becomes marginally positive, but still does not become statistically significant. Thus, we 
have little evidence that one region influences the global sample to any meaningful 
degree. 
An analysis using Kendall’s tau-b and Spearman’s rho, estimates of the strength 
of bivariate relationships when one of the variables is ordinal, produces results that are 
nearly identical to the Pearson’s r statistic. Both the tau-b (-.02) and Spearman’s rho  
(-.04) statistics reveal correlations between religious diversity and security rights 
violations for the global sample of developing countries that are very slightly negative 
and not statistically significant. 
Unlike ethnolinguistic diversity, then, religious diversity does not appear to be 
positively correlated with security rights violations based on a bivariate statistical 
analysis.  This is an interesting finding, because it runs counter to the hypothesized 
direction of the relationship.  This finding, in turn, leads to speculation as to why this 
may be the case.  Is it possible that there is something about ethnic or linguistic diversity 
that makes governments more likely to repress their citizens, while religious diversity 
does not have this effect?  Before discussing the differences between the two findings any 
further, it is necessary to perform more analyses of the bivariate relationships, and 
multivariate analyses as well. 
This chapter now moves to a visual inspection of the bivariate relationship 
between religious diversity and violations of the right to personal integrity.  An 
examination of Figure 5.4, the bivariate scatter plot of the relationship for developing 
countries in 1993, reveals little if anything about the nature of the relationship among the 
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data.  The countries are rather uniformly scattered across the graph. This is the type of 
relationship that one might expect to see when the Pearson’s correlation between the two 
variables is so small (-.01).  No evidence of any nonlinear pattern is readily detected in 
the scatter plot. Neither can one easily observe any sign of any necessary or sufficient 
relationship between religious diversity and respect for security rights.  In fact, no clear 
evidence of a negative or any other type of relationship exists.  One possible observation 
from the data is that while countries with a religious fractionalization score below .40 fall 
about equally between higher levels of the Amnesty International score (levels 4 and 5)  
Figure 5.4. Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization 

















































as they do in lower levels (levels 1 and 2), more countries with a religious 
fractionalization score above .40 are classified as low violators than as high violators of 
personal integrity rights. 
Perhaps one might think that the scatter plot for the same relationship for 1983 
(seen in Figure 5.5) would reveal some sort of clearer pattern, since the magnitude of the 
relationship was stronger in a negative direction (-.11) than were the data for 1993  
(-.01).  However, just as with the 1993 data, it is difficult to detect any type of pattern or 
conditional relationship from a visual analysis.  One difference is that in 1983, both 
diverse countries (with diversity scores of greater than .40) and less diverse countries  
Figure 5.5. Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization  





























































(with scores of less than .40) are more likely to have low Amnesty scores (one or two) 
than high ones (four or five). This is in contrast to the year 1993, where the gap only 
emerges in the case of more diverse countries. 
In Table 5.4, a cross tabulation of the bivariate relationship between religious 
diversity and security rights violations for the year 1993 reveals little, if anything, about 
any possible relationship among the data.  In fact, at least two countries appear in each of  
 
Table 5.4 Cross Tabulation of the Bivariate Relationship Between 
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the 25 cells of the cross-tabulation, indicating that countries are spread out over the entire 
range of possibilities for this bivariate relationship.  By contrast, the cross-tabulation of 
ethnolinguistic diversity and security rights violations revealed no examples of countries 
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in two of the cells at the corner of the cross-tabulation (the cell with the most diversity 
and lowest level of violations, and the cell with the least diversity and highest level of 
violations). 
A visual examination of scatter plots of the relationship between religious 
diversity and security rights violations reveals no common patterns among any of the 
regions, with the exception of North and South America.  Figures 5.6 and 5.7 reveal the  
Figure 5.6 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization  



























fact that in both regions there is a lack of countries in the upper-right half of the graph 
(i.e., there are no countries with high levels of religious diversity and high levels of 
personal integrity violations).  This finding is in contrast to the other regions of the world, 































violations.  Five of the seven countries in North and South America with the worst degree 
(a score of 4 or 5 on the Amnesty International scale) of security rights have a religious 
fractionalization score of .11 or less.  They are Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Peru.  Among countries with higher levels of religious diversity, only 
Haiti and Brazil fall into the worst categories.  Although there are not enough countries in 
the Western Hemisphere to make a meaningful generalization, there may be cause to 
investigate why the worst violators in the Americas tend to be governments in countries 
that are homogeneous from a religious (predominantly Roman Catholic) standpoint. 
 
Figure 5.7 Bivariate Scatter Plot of Religious Fractionalization  

























































In addition, an examination of the graphs of both continents reveals a similar L-
shaped pattern.  The meaning of this similarity between North and South America is 
unclear. Why did the relationship in the data occur in such a similar way in only in these 
two regions?   
The fact that North and South America have visually similar scatter plots, as well 
as almost identical Pearson’s r scores (-.48 for North America and -.46 for South 
America) appears to warrant further research in to why the two regions mirror each other 
so closely, yet do not resemble other regions. 
 
5.2  Multivariate Analyses 
a.   Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization and Security Rights 
We now move to using multivariate analysis as a tool to assess the relationship 
between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and security rights violations.  Once again, the 
year for the analysis of the data is 1993. Contained in Table 5.6 is the output from a 
model that includes several control variables that have been used in previous models (Poe 
and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). 
The model will be estimated as: 
PTS = α + (Log)â1PCGNP + â2DEMOC3 + â3THREAT + (Log)â4POP + â5LEFT  
 
+ â6BRIT + â7WBELF + ε 
 
Where: 
PTS= Political Terror Scale Score. Ranges from ‘1’ (lowest level of violations) to  




PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product. 
THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the regime. Ranges from ‘1’ (nonviolent  




LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type. 
 
BRIT= British colonial history. 
 
WBELF= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index score. 
 
Refer to Table 5.5 for a description of each variable in the model and that 
variable’s expected effect on the level of security rights.  For more discussion of the 
variables, including the data sources and anticipated effects, please refer to the 
description of the variables in Chapter Three. 
Table 5.5 Description of Variables in a Predictive Model of Security  
Rights Violations (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization  
Included), 1993. 
 
Variable Description  Effect Source   
PCGNP Log of Gross National Product, Negative Penn World Tables 
  Lagged one Time Period    
DEMOC3 Polity 3 Democracy Score Negative Polity III  
POP Log of Population  Positive Penn World Tables 
  Lagged one Time Period    
LEFT Presence of Leftist Government Positive Poe, Tate, Keith (1999) 
THREAT Threat to Regime,  Positive Poe, Tate, Keith,  
 Lagged one Time Period  and Lanier (2001) 
BRIT British Colonial History  Negative Poe, Tate, Keith (1999) 
WBELF World Bank Ethnolinguistic  Positive Annett (2000) 




Table 5.6 presents the results from a multivariate regression that predicts security 
rights violations.  An analysis of the relationship between each of the regressors in the 
model reveals no apparent problem with multicollinearity.  None of the bivariate 
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correlations between the model variables are greater than .40.  Klein tests also revealed 
no hint of multicollinearity. 
 
 
Table 5.6    Multivariate Regression of Security Rights   
                    Violations, 1993. 
 
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Per Capita GNP/ $1000 (log)  -.16 .08 .051 -.16 * 
Democracy -.06 .02 .004 -.21 * 
Threat (lagged)  .44 .06 .000 .57 * 
Population (log)  .23 .06 .000 .31 * 
Leftist Regime -.62 .33 .066 -.14 * 
British Colonial History -.07 .16 .672 -.03  
Ethnolinguistic -.98 .34 .005 -.21 * 
Fractionalization      
       
* = p< .05 (one-tailed)   Adjusted R-Squared = .62 
N=86     Root Mean Square Error= .709 
F (7, 78) = 21.17    Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
The model as a whole is rather robust, as it explains about 62 percent of the total 
variation in security rights violations, as measured by the R-Squared statistic.   An F-test 
rejects the possibility that the regression parameters could have occurred by chance 
alone.  
Moving to the impact of the individual variables, the first regressor to be 
examined is wealth. As is the case with in the Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) model, per 
capita GNP is negatively correlated with high levels of security rights violations, as 
measured by the Amnesty International score.  This measure is also statistically 
significant at the .05 level.   
The level of democracy, as measured by the Polity III (which is intended to 
capture the level of opportunity for participation in a political system), is also negatively 
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related to security rights violations, and its coefficient is statistically significant at the .05 
level. 
As predicted, the level of threat to the regime has a strong, positive effect on the 
level of security rights violations.  This finding is consistent with the earlier findings of 
Poe, Tate, Keith, and Lanier (2001). 
Population also has the same effect as hypothesized in the Poe et al. analyses. 
Higher populations are associated with higher levels of personal integrity abuse, an effect 
that is statistically significant at the .05 level. 
Regime type is another variable that is included in the model. Counter to the 
hypothesis above, a leftist regime leads to lower levels of security rights violations, 
ceteris paribus (holding other factors constant).  This statistic is statistically significant 
using a one-tailed t-test with a significance level of .05.  
The last control variable, history of British rule, does not appear to be associated 
with either a higher or lower level of personal integrity abuse. The coefficient reveals a 
negative relationship between British colonial history and personal integrity violations, as 
was the case with the work of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999).  However, the coefficient 
(-.03) is small and does not approach statistical significance. 
Finally, the model reveals the effects of our research variable, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization.  Controlling statistically for alternative explanations for why regimes 
violate the personal integrity rights of their citizens, more diverse countries are associated 
with lower (better) Amnesty International scores.  In other words, higher levels of 
ethnolinguistic diversity, ceteris paribus, leads to lower levels of personal integrity abuse.  
The finding that higher levels of ethnic diversity correspond to lower levels of state-
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sponsored security rights violations runs counter to the hypothesized direction of the 
effect. 
Does ethnolinguistic diversity really affect respect for security rights in a 
meaningful way?  In order to answer this question a regression with all of the explanatory 
variables except ethnolinguistic fractionalization was run.  I find that the adjusted R-
Squared falls from .62 to .57, meaning that one can explain a full five percentage more of 
the total variance when one includes ethnolinguistic fractionalization in a model of 
security rights.  The additional impact that ethnolinguistic diversity adds to the dependent 
variable suggests that ethnolinguistic diversity contributes in a non-trivial way to 
statistical attempts to explain respect for security rights.     
In evaluating the overall impact of the various explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable, personal integrity abuse, it is apparent that level of threat faced by a 
country’s ruling regime has the greatest effect. Its beta weight is .57, much higher than 
that of any other regressor. Population has the second greatest effect, with a beta of .31.  
Democracy, per capita GNP, and leftist regime type all have much smaller effects. The 
beta weight of British history is quite small, and since its effect is not statistically 
significant, it appears to not have a major direct impact on the propensity of governments 
to violate the security rights of their citizens. 
An examination of the standardized coefficients reveals that ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, the variable whose effects are the subject of this study, has a relative 
impact that is about the same as that of wealth (measured by per capita GNP), and 
somewhat higher than that of democracy. Its effect is just over half as large as that of 
population, and just over a third than that of threat to regime. 
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In short, a multivariate analysis reveals that ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a 
nontrivial and statistically significant depressing effect on security rights violations.  
Holding other potential explanatory factors at their statistical means, countries that are 
more diverse are less likely to violate the right to personal integrity of their citizens. From 
this brief analysis, an argument might be presented for the inclusion of ethnolinguistic 
diversity in the growing list of phenomena that are linked by researchers to the level of 
security rights violations by regimes.  Again, it is interesting to note that ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization exhibits a downward effect on the level of security rights violations, 
which is counter to the expectation that higher levels of diversity will lead to higher 
levels of repression. 
It may be possible to go farther in analyzing this relationship. By positing and 
empirically testing causal linkages between the various explanatory factors, we may 
obtain a clearer picture of how these various causal factors are related to one another. 
A first step in model building is often to trim the model of variables that are not 
found to have a significant effect. In the model above, a British colonial history is not 
found to have a statistically significant effect on personal integrity abuse, ceteris paribus.  
And its relative impact is found to be very small in terms of its beta weight.  Therefore, a 
good first step would be to re-estimate the model without the British history variable. 
Table 5.7 reveals that eliminating the British rule variable has almost no reduction 
of the explanatory power of the model. The root mean square error is virtually 
unchanged, and the adjusted R-Squared actually improves. Thus, a good starting point for 
a causal model will be the combination of variables in Table 5.6.  There is virtually no 







Table 5.7     Multivariate Regression of Security Rights Violations,  
British History Variable Omitted, 1993. 
  
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Per Capita GNP/$1000 (logged) -.16 .08 .054 -.16 * 
Democracy -.06 .02 .004 -.20 * 
Threat (lagged)  .45 .06 .000 .57 * 
Population (t-1) (logged)  .23 .06 .000 .31 * 
Leftist Regime -.61 .33 .068 -.14 * 
Ethnolinguistic -.98 .34 .005 -.21 * 
Fractionalization      
       
* = p<.05 (one-tailed)   Adjusted R-Squared = .63 
N=86     Root Mean Square Error= .705 
F (6, 79) = 24.93    Prob > F = 0.0001 
 
 
In order to better specify the relationship between diversity and security rights, a 
path analytical model is presented in Figure 5.8.  In this causal model, all of the variables 
in the original regression are hypothesized to have the same direct effects on the 
dependent variable, threat to regime, and security rights. However, the model also 
attempts to capture the indirect effects of two of the variables, religious fractionalization 
and population. The rationale for assessing the indirect effects of these two variables is as 
follows: We are interested in the effects of all of the model variables on the dependent 
variable. But three of the variables, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, population, and the 
leftist regime variable, can be considered to be exogenous. In other words, none of the 
model variables can be hypothesized to have an effect on them directly.   
Of these three exogenous variables, it is not plausible that the leftist regime 
variable has an effect on any of the variables in the model.  However, it may be that the 
other two exogenous variables, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and population, may 
affect wealth, democratic openness, and threat to regime.    In keeping with the existing 
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hypothesis above, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is hypothesized to reduce the level of 
respect for security rights.  Thus, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is hypothesized as 
leading to a lower level of wealth and democratic openness, and a higher level of threat to 
the regime.  In keeping with the generally negative theoretical and empirical evidence 
regarding the effects of population, this variable is also hypothesized to lower wealth and 
democratic openness, and increase the level of threat to the regime. 
Figure 5.8   Causal Model of Security Rights Violations  
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This model is an improvement of a linear multivariate model because it allows for 
the inclusion of both direct and indirect effects of the model variables. This is particularly 
useful for understanding the effects of the independent variable that we are interested in, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
Figure 5.8 displays a path diagram of a causal model involving the variables in 
the equation above.  Included in the diagram are unidirectional links between variables 
and the hypothesized direction of the relationship.  
Essentially, the way this model can be estimated is by working backwards, 
making security rights violations a dependent variable, and the other model variables 
independent.  Subsequently, the other endogenous variables--per capita GNP, democracy, 
and threat--are made dependent variables to those variables hypothesized to be 
exogenous to them, population and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. The direction and 
relative strength of each of the variables can be obtained from the beta weights in each 
regression. Following Tan (1999), only the links that are statistically significant at the .10 
level (one-tailed) or higher are drawn in the diagram. 
Table 5.8    Regression of Per Capita GNP, 1993.   
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Population  -.16 .061 .008 -.26 * 
Ethnolinguistic -1.34 .452 .004 -.28 * 
Fractionalization      
* = p<.10 (one-tailed)    N=86 
Table 5.9    Regression of Democracy, 1993.  
      
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta 
Population  -.14 .29 .62 -.06 
Ethnolinguistic -1.46 1.80 .42 -.09 
Fractionalization     




Table 5.10    Regression of Threat, 1993.  
      
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta 
Population  .30 .07 .000 .39 
Ethnolinguistic .53 .55 .337 .09 
Fractionalization     
* = p<.10 (one-tailed)    N=86 
 
Tables 5.7 through 5.10 show the regressions that are necessary to estimate the set 
of equations that comprise the fully estimated causal model in Figure 5.8.  The direct 
effects, which are the beta weights in each of the regressions, are calculated in Table 5.7. 
In order to obtain the indirect effects, the endogenous explanatory variables, per capita 
GNP, democracy, and threat are regressed [in Tables 5.8 through 5.10] on the two 
variables that are hypothesized to affect them--population and ethnolinguistic diversity. 
Figure 5.9 is a fully estimated causal model of security rights. The path diagrams 
of the relationships in the model allow for a better understanding of the relative effects of 
all of the independent variables on the dependent variable, accounting for both their 
direct and indirect impacts on security rights. 
An analysis of the results from the multivariate causal model in Figure 5.9 reveals 
a number of interesting findings.  In Table 5.11 one can see that the direct effect of higher 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is a lower level of security rights violations  
(beta= -.21), all other factors held constant. However, this effect is somewhat offset by 
the indirect effect via per capita GNP (beta= .04). In other words, while the direct effect 
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is to lower the level of security rights violations, it 
also corresponds to a lower level of wealth, which in turn is associated with higher levels 
of repression, ceteris paribus.  Nonetheless, although the indirect effect of ethnolinguistic  
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diversity is to raise security rights violations, the overall net effect still leads to lower 
levels of repression. 
 
 
Figure 5.9   Causal Model of Personal Integrity Rights Violations 
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Judging from the beta weights presented in Table 5.11, the relative impact of 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is slightly smaller than that of democratic openness, and 
slightly larger than that of per capita GNP and the presence of a leftist regime type. 
However, ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a relative effect on the dependent variable 
that is less than a third as strong as the threat variable and of population (with net effects 
of .57 each). 
 
Table 5.11     Direct and Indirect Effects of Model   
     Variables on Security Rights Violations, 1993.  
      
  Direct Indirect  Total 
Per Capita GNP -.16 N/A  -.16 
Democracy -.20 N/A  -.20 
Threat  .57 N/A  .57 
Leftist Regime -.14 N/A  -.14 
Population  .31 .04  (via GNP) .57 
   .22  (via threat)  
Ethnolinguistic -.21 .04  (via GNP) -.17 
Fractionalization     
 
If the findings for the year 1993 can be generalized to other time periods, these 
findings may indicate that ethnolinguistic fractionalization does not have a harmful effect 
on security rights. In fact, when one accounts the effects of alternative explanatory 
variables, its net effect on security rights actually appears to be beneficial.  This being 
said, the effect of ethnicity does not appear to be particularly powerful in comparison to 






b.  Religious Fractionalization and Security Rights 
 This chapter now moves to an analysis of the multivariate relationship between 
security rights and religious fractionalization. Table 5.13 is a multivariate model that uses 
religious rather than ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an explanatory variable. 
 The model will be estimated as: 
PTS = α + (log)â1PCGNP + â2DEMOC3 + â3THREAT + (log)â4POP + â5LEFT  
 
+ â6BRIT + â7WBREL + ε 
 
Where: 
PTS= Political Terror Scale Score. Ranges from ‘1’ (lowest level of violations) to  
‘5’ (most severe violations). 
 
PCGNP= Per Capita Gross National Product. 
THREAT= Degree of threat faced by the Regime. Ranges from ‘1’ (nonviolent  




LEFT= Presence of a leftist regime type. 
 
BRIT= British colonial history. 
 
WBREL= World Bank Religious Fractionalization Index score. 
 
Refer back to Table 4.12 for a description of the variables. For further information 
about the variables in the model, please refer to Chapter 3. 
The results of Table 5.12 are similar in most respects to those in Table 5.5, which 
included ethnolinguistic fractionalization as the independent variable rather than the 
current variable of interest, religious fractionalization.  Almost all of the relationships 
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among the variables in this analysis have coefficients that are signed in the same direction 
and of similar magnitude as was the case with ethnolinguistic fractionalization.  As in the 
model including ethnolinguistic fractionalization, only the coefficient for history of 
British rule does not approach statistical significance.  The notable difference in the two 
models is that while ethnolinguistic fractionalization had a statistically significant 
negative effect (at the .05 level) on the level of security rights violations, religious 
fractionalization does not achieve statistical significance except at the .10 level. In other 
words, while both diversity variables are negatively signed, indicating an inverse 
relationship with personal integrity abuse, the coefficient for ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization achieves a higher level of statistical significance. 
 
Table 5.12    Multivariate Regression of Security Rights Violations, 1993.  
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Log Per Capita GNP/$1000 (t-1)  -.12 .08 .148 -.13 * 
Democracy -.06 .02 .005 -.21 * 
Threat (t-1)  .43 .06 .000 .56 * 
Log Population (t-1)  .19 .06 .001 .26 * 
Leftist Regime -.51 .35 .142 -.11 * 
British Colonial History .04 .18 832 .02  
Religious -.53 .36 .147 -.12  
Fractionalization      
       
* = p<.05 (one-tailed)   Adjusted R-Squared = .60 
N=86     Root Mean Square Error= .736 
F (7, 78) = 18.84    Prob > F = 0.0000 
 When religious diversity replaces ethnolinguistic diversity [see Table 5.5 for the 
earlier model] as a variable in an explanatory model of personal integrity abuse, the 
goodness-of-fit is slightly worse.  Table 5.12 reveals that when the switch is made, the 
model’s adjusted R-Squared drops from .62 to .60, and the root mean squared error rises 
from .709 to .736.  Because of the somewhat poorer quality of model fit and the fact that 
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religious diversity is not statistically significant at the .05 level in a multivariate model of 
personal integrity abuse, a comparison of the two models lends support for the argument 
that the religious fractionalization variable does not have as much of an impact in 
reducing personal integrity abuse as does ethnolinguistic fractionalization. 
 However, it may be the case that some further evidence of the relationship 
between religious diversity and security rights may emerge from a multivariate causal 
model.  Again, a common first step in creating a causal model is to eliminate variables 
that are not statistically significant.  Since once again the British history variable does not 
achieve statistical significance, it can be dropped and the equation from Table 5.12 can be 
re-estimated. Results from this analysis appear in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.13      Multivariate Regression of Security Rights Violations  
            (British History Variable Omitted), 1993. 
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Logged Per Capita GNP (t-1) -.12 .08 .148 -.12  
Democracy -.06 .02 .005 -.21 * 
Threat (t-1)  .43 .06 .000 .56 * 
Log Population (t-1)  .19 .06 .001 .26 * 
Leftist Regime -.52 .34 .135 -.11  
Religious -.50 .33 .137 -.12  
Fractionalization      
       
* = p<.05 (one-tailed)   Adjusted R-Squared = .60 
N=86     Root Mean Square Error= .731 
F (6, 79) = 21.32    Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Predictably, the output of this model does not change very much. Religious 
fractionalization not only is still not statistically significant at the .05 level, and the beta 
coefficient is the same (-.12).  All of the other model coefficients are still found to be 
statistically significant and in the same direction as before. As for goodness-of-fit, 
dropping the British historical influence variable leaves the adjusted R-Squared 
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unchanged at .60, and the mean squared error declines from .736 to .731.  Because the 
model is more parsimonious and its goodness-of-fit is slightly better, it is safe to say that 
this is a better model than the full model. 
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In order to better specify the relationship between religious diversity and security 
rights, a path analytical model is presented in Figure 5.10.  As in the model for the effect 
of ethnolinguistic fractionalization above, all of the variables in the original regression 
are hypothesized to have the same (harmful) direct effects on security rights, threat to 
regime, and security rights. The model also attempts to capture the indirect effects of two 
of the variables, religious fractionalization and population. We are interested in assessing 
the indirect effects of religious fractionalization and population because it allow us to 
more fully understand the relationship among the variables in the model.  
We are interested in the effects of all of the model variables on the dependent 
variable. But, as before, three of the variables, religious fractionalization, population, and 
the leftist regime variable, can be considered to be exogenous. That is, none of the model 
variables can be hypothesized to have an effect on them directly.   
Of these three exogenous variables, there is not a theoretical expectation that the 
leftist regime variable has an effect on any of the variables in the model.  However, it 
may be that the other two exogenous variables, religious fractionalization and population, 
may affect wealth, democratic openness, and threat to regime.   Religious 
fractionalization is hypothesized to have a derogatory effect on security rights, and is 
hypothesized to have a harmful effect on the three endogenous variables in the model. 
Thus, it is hypothesized to increase the level of wealth and democratic openness, and to 
lower the level of threat to the regime.  In keeping with the generally negative theoretical 
and empirical evidence regarding the effects of population, religious fractionalization is 
also hypothesized to lower wealth and democratic openness, and increase the level of 
threat to the regime. 
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This model will better allow for the estimation of the actual effects of the 
variables by allowing for the estimation of both direct and indirect effects. This is 
particularly useful for understanding the effects of the independent variable of interest, 
religious fractionalization. 
Tables 5.14 through 5.16 display the results of the other regressions necessary to 
complete estimation of the causal model of security rights that uses religious 
fractionalization as an explanatory variable. In Table 5.14, one can see that religious 
fractionalization has a negative effect on wealth, controlling for population size. Table 
5.15 reveals the finding that religious diversity is negatively correlated with level of 
democratic openness, net of population size. The result of Table 5.16 is that population 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the level of threat to a regime when 
controlling for the effects of population size. Rather, higher populations appear to be an 
important factor that contributes to higher levels of threat. 
 
Table 5.14    Regression of Per Capita GNP, 1993.   
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Population  -.24 .06 .000 -.37 * 
Religious -1.56 .41 000 -.33 * 
Fractionalization      
* = p<.10 (one-tailed)    N=86 
 
Table 5.15    Regression of Democracy, 1993.   
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Population  -.23 .28 .401 -.09  
Religious -.255 1.64 .123 -.17 * 
Fractionalization      





Table 5.16    Regression of Threat, 1993.   
       
  Coef. Std. Err. p>|t| Beta  
Population  .33 .07 .000 .41 * 
Religious -.25 .51 .63 -.04   
Fractionalization      
* = p<.10 (one-tailed)    N=86 
An inspection of the path diagram in Figure 5.11, reveals only one notable 
difference from the earlier model (Figure 5.9), which included ethnolinguistic rather than 
religious fractionalization. The beta weight of the effect of religious fractionalization 
(.12) is noticeably less than the effect of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (.21).  All of the 
other effects in the model are of the same direction and of similar magnitude as was the 
case in the earlier model.  Per capita GNP, level of democratic openness, and leftist 
regime all are associated with lower levels of repression of the right to personal integrity. 
Likewise, size of population and level of threat to regime are associated with increased 
levels of repression, ceteris paribus.   
 Table 5.17 reveals that the relative impacts of the other model variables (as 
measured by their beta weights) are rather similar to what they were in the model that 
uses ethnolinguistic fractionalization as the explanatory diversity variable (Table 5.10).  
Interestingly, while the total impact of religious diversity is negative (beta= -.04), its 
effect is of a smaller magnitude than when ethnolinguistic fractionalization (beta= -.17) is 
used as the measure of diversity.  While the direct effect of religious fractionalization is 
to lower personal integrity violations (beta= -.12), it indirectly leads to higher levels of 
violations because it is positively associated with two harmful effects-- lower levels 
wealth and democratic openness. Thus, the relatively small net impact of religious 
fractionalization is a result of the harmful indirect effects it has on security rights via 
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Figure 5.11     Causal Model of Security Rights Violations  
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Table 5.17        Direct and Indirect Effects of Model   
        Variables on Security Rights, 1993.  
      
  Direct Indirect  Total 
Per Capita GNP -.12 N/A  -.12 
Democracy -.21 N/A  -.21 
Threat  .56 N/A  .56 
Leftist Regime -.11 N/A  -.11 
Population  .26 .04  (via GNP)  
   .23  (via threat) .53 
Religious -.12 .04  (via GNP)  




Does the level of ethnic and religious diversity in a given population lead, all things being 
equal, to more or less government respect for security rights?  This chapter attempts to 
answer this question using both bivariate and multivariate analyses.  The following broad 
findings emerge from an analysis of the relationship between religious diversity and 
security rights: 
First, a simple bivariate analysis shows that, as hypothesized, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is positively associated with a higher level of security rights violations, 
as measured by the Amnesty International Political Terror Scale measure.  The same 
relationship does not emerge with religious fractionalization, however, as it is not found 
to be correlated with personal integrity abuse.  Why exactly one type of diversity is 
related to higher personal integrity violations and the other is not is a question that needs 
to be investigated in future research.  Bivariate scatter plots do not suggest any type of 
linear or nonlinear relationship between either type of diversity and security rights.  
Finally, the visual scatter plots of both religious and ethnolinguistic diversity reveal no 
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linear or nonlinear relationships, and do not hint at any type of necessary or sufficient 
conditional relationship between independent and dependent variables. 
Second, as is the case in the previous chapter, the bivariate relationship between 
diversity and security rights appears to manifest itself differently in different regions of 
the world.  While in the global sample of countries, ethnolinguistic fractionalization is 
found to be associated with higher levels of personal integrity abuse, the only continent in 
which this finding is reproduced is in Asia.  In the case of religious fractionalization, 
diversity is only a statistically significant factor in the case of one region—it is negatively 
associated with personal integrity abuse in North America.  No common patterns emerge 
among the data when regional scatter plots are observed.   
Third, in a multivariate context, ethnolinguistic fractionalization corresponds to 
lower levels of security rights violations.  This finding runs counter to the hypothesized 
direction of the relationship. When accounting for population size and degree of threat 
faced by a regime, both of which raise the level of security rights violations, 
ethnolinguistic diversity has a positive effect on security rights.  While a multivariate 
regression reveals that it has a beneficial effect, the net impact of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is only about one-third that of population size and domestic threat.  
When  included in a causal model that captures both direct and indirect effects, this net 
effect shrinks even further, as the ethnolinguistic diversity has a small indirect positive 
effect on the level of security rights violations, via the fact that it lowers per capita GNP.  
Fourth, in a multivariate model, religious fractionalization also has the effect of 
lowering the level of security rights violations, ceteris paribus.  In order to get a picture 
of the direct and indirect impacts of the variables in the model, a multivariate causal 
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model was employed.  This model reveals that while religious diversity does lead to a 
reduced level of security rights violations in a country, its relative impact on the 
dependent variable is only about one-fourth of the effect of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization, largely because its beneficial direct effect is somewhat offset by the fact 
that it is associated with lower levels of wealth and democracy, which indirectly leads to  
higher security rights violations.  
 To summarize, an analysis of the relationship between diversity and security 
rights reveals that higher levels of both religious and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are 
related to lower levels of personal integrity violations, ceteris paribus.  While both types 
of diversity have beneficial net effects, the effect of religious fractionalization is much 
smaller.  
 Chapter Six will summarize the important findings of the paper, and discuss the 




CHAPTER 6  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The central purpose of this dissertation has been to explore the relationship 
between societal diversity and basic human rights.  Since the existing social science 
literature has little to say regarding this topic, it is a very challenging endeavor to create 
new theoretical ideas about the nature of this relationship, and to find appropriate ways to 
empirically test this body of theory.  Hopefully, future efforts will further assess how 
diversity affects rights performance.  This chapter summarizes the empirical findings of 
my research and discusses their implications.  I will also suggest possible directions for 
further research. 
6.1   Summary of Findings 
In Chapter 4, I explored the relationship between cultural diversity and 
subsistence rights.  Most prior research has focused on the interaction between diversity 
and economic performance, and generally found that the more diverse the society, the 
lower the society’s economic performance.  I hypothesized that governments are be less 
likely to ensure that the right to subsistence in ethnically and linguistically diverse 
countries.  The analyses appear to confirm this hypothesis. 
 A bivariate analysis of a sample of developing nations in reveals that in both the 
1980s and 1990s ethnolinguistic diversity were statistically correlated with lower levels 
of Physical Quality of Life.  This relationship is statistically significant.  The relationship 
occurs in the same direction when religious diversity is used as the explanatory variable, 
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although the relationship is not as strong as for ethnolinguistic diversity.  While one 
cannot discount the possibility that the effect of religion on the dependent variable is 
weaker, a possible explanation for the difference is that the range of values for the 
religion variable is somewhat smaller. This difference may partly explain why the 
relationship between religious diversity and subsistence rights is weaker. 
 I also performed multivariate analyses that included a number of control 
variables.  Ethnolinguistic diversity was again found to have a statistically significant 
downward effect on subsistence rights.  In addition, the absolute value of its effect was 
rather strong, as only democracy was found to have a higher relative impact on the 
dependent variable.  Religious diversity also had a statistically significant downward 
effect on the level of subsistence rights, but its relative effect was not as strong as for 
ethnolinguistic diversity.  Three other variables in this model had relative effects that 
were higher. Thus, in a multivariate context it appears that ethnolinguistic diversity has a 
greater effect on human rights performance than does religious diversity. 
 Finally, I tested the relationship between diversity and subsistence rights using 
path analysis.  This type of statistical analysis uses the same variables used in the 
regressions above, but orders them in a logical causal fashion that allows for testing not 
only of direct effects, but indirect effects through intervening variables as well.  Using 
this type of analysis, ethnolinguistic diversity again exhibits a statistically significant 
downward effect on the level of subsistence rights.  In fact, when accounting for both 
direct and indirect effects, ethnolinguistic diversity actually has an impact on the 
dependent variable that has the highest absolute impact of any variable in the model.  In 
addition to its direct effect, ethnolinguistic diversity has a harmful indirect effect on 
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subsistence performance because it contributes to lower levels of economic development, 
which in turn has a downward effect on subsistence rights levels.  In short, the effect of 
ethnic and linguistic cleavages is found to be clearly deleterious toward the level of 
subsistence rights in a given society, ceteris paribus (holding all other factors constant).   
 When employing a causal model, religious diversity was also found to have a 
statistically significant adverse effect on the level of subsistence enjoyed by citizens.  
While the direct effect of religious diversity is only about half of that of ethnolinguistic 
diversity, when one includes the indirect effects in the model, religious diversity has 
nearly as harmful an effect on subsistence rights as its fellow diversity measure.  The two 
variables that intervene between religious diversity and lower subsistence rights are level 
of economic development and level of threat.  Higher levels of religious diversity lead to 
lower levels of the former and higher levels of the latter, which both correspond to lower 
performance on the subsistence rights measure. 
  The results from Chapter 4 not only point toward high levels of ethnolinguistic 
and religious diversity leading to lower levels of subsistence rights, but they also suggest 
that the situation is exacerbated by the presence of lower levels of economic development 
in diverse societies.  The finding that both types of societal diversity are harmful to 
subsistence rights is consistent with the hypotheses laid out in Chapter Three.  
 Chapter 5 explores the relationship between diversity and security rights.  Most 
research related to this area of inquiry focuses on the nexus between diversity and ethnic 
conflict or violence.  Many, though not all, of these studies find that higher levels of 
diversity lead to higher levels of violence.  I theorized that high levels of both 
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ethnolinguistic and religious diversity lead to a higher level of security rights violations.  
The findings of this analysis are more complex than those for subsistence rights. 
 An inspection of the bivariate relationship between ethnolinguistic diversity and 
security rights showed that higher levels of ethnic and religious heterogeneity were 
associated with higher levels of violations of personal integrity rights.  However, 
religious diversity did not have a statistically significant effect on security rights. 
 Moving to a multivariate analysis of security rights, both types of diversity were 
statistically found to lower the level of security rights violations.  This ran counter to the 
hypotheses, which posited a harmful effect for higher levels of diversity.  However, the 
relative effects of the diversity variable were small when compared to the effects of other 
model variables.  In particular, the level of threat to the regime posed by a society has a 
much larger effect than diversity. 
 The path analytical models also find that both types of diversity lowered the level 
of personal integrity violations.  The effect of ethnolinguistic diversity is less than a third 
that of population size and the level of threat to the regime posed by society.  
Comparatively speaking, the effect of religious diversity, while still nominally beneficial 
and statistically significant, is very small. While its direct effect is somewhat small in 
comparison with other model variables, this effect is diminished even further due to the 
harmful indirect effects it has on security rights through lowering the levels of wealth and 
democracy.  The total effect of religious diversity, then, is much smaller than any of the 
other variables in the path analytical model, and is less than one-twelfth that of two of the 
other variables, population and threat to regime.    
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 Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from these results.  First, although 
they have somewhat comparable effects, ethnolinguistic and religious diversity clearly do 
not measure exactly the same concept.  Particularly when it comes to security rights, 
religious diversity clearly does not have as beneficial a net effect as does ethnolinguistic 
diversity.  I suspect that part of the difference in the effects of the variables may be due to 
measurement issues, since ethnolinguistic fractionalization has a greater range of 
variation than its religious counterpart.    
 Second, societal heterogeneity is found to be related not only to poor economic 
performance, but to poor levels of subsistence as well.  This finding should not be 
surprising, since it makes intuitive sense that governments in poorer countries are less 
able to meet the basic needs of their citizens.  The theoretical implications for the 
economic development literature are that the limitations upon economic efficiency that 
are hypothesized to come from cultural diversity (i.e., due to less flexible institutions, 
higher transaction costs, etc.) extend not only to wealth but to basic human needs as well.  
This research also adds weight to the arguments of scholars such as Douglass North that 
high societal pluralism forces leaders to devote too many resources to goods beneficial 
only to single groups rather than to public goods that can benefit all.  As a potential 
explanation for poor levels of subsistence rights, this idea appears to hold great promise, 
particularly since theories of state behavior with regard to subsistence rights protection 
are scarce. 
 Since this research has found a greater role for ethnic and linguistic diversity than 
for religious diversity in explaining poor subsistence rights in the developing world, it 
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appears that future research should focus on the role of culture and language as keys to 
subsistence rights and economic well-being. 
 From a practical standpoint, this finding sounds a pessimistic note about the 
ability of diverse nations to provide for the basic necessities of their own people.  While 
other factors may play a larger role, at the least it appears safe to say that these findings 
present a credible challenge to the position that diversity might improve subsistence 
rights performance.  
 Third, the relationship between cultural heterogeneity and provision of security 
rights appears to be an extremely complicated one.  While simple bivariate analyses 
detected little beneficial effect of ethnic diversity on violations to personal integrity, 
multivariate analyses suggest that diversity contributes to better personal integrity 
performance.  Clearly, as previous research suggests, there are a large number of factors, 
including regime type, economic development, political conditions, demographic factors, 
and many others, that combine to determine the level of respect a government has for 
personal integrity rights.  Unfortunately, this research does not shed much light on the 
complex relationship between diversity and security rights within this bigger picture.  At 
the minimum, this research suggests caution to avoid the trap of assuming that because 
diverse countries tend to violate the personal integrity rights of their citizens, there is a 
direct relationship between higher levels of societal pluralism and higher levels of 
security rights violations.  While it is indeed quite possible that diversity presents many 
challenges to the prospects for societal order and good governance, it would be folly to 
argue that merely because a society is diverse, leaders are more likely to use repression as 
a governance strategy.   Thus, this research places in question the widely held view that 
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regimes in more diverse societies are somehow more repressive than in less 
heterogeneous settings.   
Notably, then, this research effort does not support the arguments of those who 
believe that diversity is problematic for good governance, such as Mill and Dahl.  It 
rejects the research hypothesis that diversity is harmful to security rights.  Perhaps it is 
the case (in line with the position of Etzioni) that the existence of a diverse set of 
mobilized groups in society serves as a restraint on state behavior.  This finding clearly 
deserves more attention from future research.   
Perhaps this counterintuitive finding means that regimes in diverse regimes are 
more constrained from employing repressive measures than are their counterparts in more 
homogeneous societies.  It may be the case that a multiplicity of groups allows for greater 
level of civil society, which can serve as a bulwark against repressive state behavior.  
This possibility is in agreement with the views of Etzioni (2001), who believes that social 
capital develops (“thickens”) when different groups develop informal norms of tolerance, 
trust, and mutual restraint.  The presence of diversity does have the potential to divide 
people of different nationalities.  However in situations where a common national 
identity emerges, such as in the United States, Etzioni argues that the presence of a 
multiplicity of nationalities within a common state (a “community of communities”) is 
benign. Americans are “contained by a shared American creed and a set of related 
institutions.”  Within this common framework, they are able to express their cultural 
uniqueness.  To Etzioni, the fact that a multiplicity of groups has a role in defining values 
is preferable to a situation in which all values are defined by the state because individuals 
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have a greater deal of freedom to express their individual cultural identities without 
directly clashing with the state (Etzioni 2001).   
 Finally, I must point out that it would be a mistake, based on this research, to 
assume that the manipulation of borders or populations to alter societal diversity levels 
will improve social outcomes.  As Paul Collier (1998) points out, “There is nothing 
which a country can legitimately do about its ethnic composition, and illegitimate acts, 
notably ethnic cleansing, should hardly be encouraged" (1).  In other words, if social 
scientists confirm the fact that diversity leads to lower subsistence rights, this does not 
mean that borders should be redrawn to create a more homogeneous world. This type of 
solution might well be worse than the cure.  The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, which included a number of ethnic cleansings, is an example of the devastating 
results of attempting to redraw a country along ethnic lines.    
 However, in practical terms, powerful countries such as the United States do 
periodically have the opportunity to create new regimes from old ones. An excellent 
example is the former Yugoslavia, where the United States has approved measures to 
create multiethnic countries (i.e., Bosnia), as well as tacitly approved measures designed 
to make countries more homogeneous (as is the case when they assisted the Croatian 
Army to remove Serbs from Eastern Croatia).  In any case, the current bias of the United 
States toward tinkering with ethnicity (i.e., Afghanistan, Yugoslavia) can not be 
corroborated by this research effort.  There is nothing in my findings that strongly 
suggests that a regime in a diverse nation is more or less likely to violate the security 




6.2  Suggestions for Further Research 
 Political scientists have only begun to explore how ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
and other types of societal heterogeneity affect political and economic factors.  As a 
result, I hope that future research focuses on finding out the true nature of the effects of 
diversity.  Part of this means improving the available data on societal diversity.  It will be 
a challenging task will to create new testable theories regarding the effects of diversity, 
so that this phenomenon can be integrated into the existing body of knowledge regarding 
the determinants of political and economic performance.   
One concrete suggestion is to research the relationships between diversity and 
political stability, societal trust, and the level of threat posed to regimes by disaffected 
groups in society.  Perhaps some sort of public opinion study or some other individual-
level type of research will shed light on the role of cultural diversity and group identity in 
building societal trust and increasing the propensity to join organized opposition groups.    
A second suggestion is that researchers attempt to clearly understand and measure 
the concept of societal heterogeneity.  Much of the existing literature measures the 
concept of diversity with a single formula, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index.  This 
measure is certainly better than no measure at all, but its conceptual value is limited.  It 
yields only a single numerical value for diversity in a society, failing to specify the 
number of groups in the society or the relative sizes of each group.  So, for example, it 
does not distinguish between a country with only a few groups of relatively equal size 
and a country with several smaller groups.  Since such societies might well be very 
different or behave differently, one would not expect a measure that does not capture 
differences between the two types of diversity to be ideal for measuring societal 
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heterogeneity.  Hopefully, the solution will be come in the form of a multidimensional 
measure of diversity that can capture the effects of both the relative distribution of groups 
in society and the number of groups in society.  In addition, researchers need to clarify 
more clearly exactly what they mean by “ethnic” and “religious” diversity before they 
begin to gather data for these measures, so that they know exactly what type of data they 
need to collect.   
 Third, researchers need to create and test theories that specify different effects for 
different types of diversity.  In my dissertation I do not distinguish theoretically between 
religious and ethnolinguistic diversity, yet I find differences in the effects of these two 
factors.  At this time, there is no literature that I am aware of that discusses the 
differences between these types of diversity.  Yet it may make sense to expect different 
effects from different concepts. 
The final suggestion is one aimed at human rights researchers.  In preparing this 
dissertation, I have noticed that in the community of economists who study economic 
development and political stability in the developing world, researchers are able to 
successfully integrate the findings of their colleagues regarding the effects of diversity 
into their own research efforts.  By contrast, the political science community, in the study 
of diversity as in many other areas of research, often blissfully ignores the work of other 
disciplines. I urge all researchers studying of the political effects of diversity to work 
together rather than separately, as the possibility for cumulation and integration of 






Variable | Obs        Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
---------+------------------------------------------------- 
   wbrel | 105    .3669524   .2648662          0        .79   
   wbelf | 106    .5435849   .2577935        .06        .95   
 pqlilag | 106    64.85764    17.6019      23.67      91.39   
 lpoplag | 106    15.62528   1.916605      11.14      20.87    
threatl1 | 106    1.773585   1.501003          0          4    
    left | 106    .0660377   .2495279          0          1   
    brit | 106    .4245283   .4966193          0          1    
   sdnew | 106    2.830189   1.334321          1          5   
   ainew | 106    2.764151    1.26906          1          5    
  democ3 |  87    4.126437   4.068611          0         10   
 newpqli | 106     65.1734   17.54388      24.23       91.5    




wbrel= World Bank Religious Fractionalization Index Score 
 
wbelf= World Bank Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Index Score 
 
pqlilag= Physical Quality of Life Index Score (1992) 
 
lpoplag= Log of population (1992) 
 
threatl1= Threat to regime from organized opposition (1992) 
 
left= Leftist regime type dummy variable (1993) 
 
brit= British colonial influence dummy variable 
 
sdnew= State Department Political Terror Scale score (1993) 
 
ainew= Amnesty International Political Terror Scale score (1993) 
 
democ3= Polity 3 democracy score (1993) 
 
newpqli= Physical Quality of Life Index score (1993) 
 
pcgnplgl= Log of Per capita GNP (1992)  
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF COUNTRIES AND DIVERSITY SCORES 
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Country Ethnoling. Religious Country Ethnoling. Religious 
 Frac. Frac.  Frac. Frac. 
Algeria 0.30 0.02 Ghana 0.73 0.79 
Angola 0.80 0.48 Grenada 0.54 0.47 
Argentina 0.41 0.16 Guatemala 0.52 0.11 
Bahamas 0.44 0.45 Guinea 0.77 0.44 
Bahrain 0.38 0.1 Guyana 0.63 0.72 
Bangladesh 0.07 0.25 Haiti 0.10 0.3 
Barbados 0.20 0.3 Honduras 0.25 0.08 
Belize 0.58 0.48 India 0.90 0.36 
Benin 0.87 0.56 Indonesia 0.79 0.68 
Bolivia  0.71 0.14 Iran  0.76 0.04 
Botswana 0.48 0.65 Iraq 0.39 0.08 
Brazil 0.64 0.22 Israel 0.29 0.21 
Burkino Faso 0.76 0.61 Ivory Coast 0.87 0.71 
Burundi 0.29 0.36 Jamaica 0.35 0.47 
Cameroon 0.82 0.75 Jordan 0.52 0.13 
Cape Verde 0.48 0.08 Kenya 0.90 0.79 
Cent. African 
Rep. 
0.79 0.62 Kuwait 0.73 0.09 
Chad 0.78 0.7 Laos 0.61 0.55 
Chile 0.43 0.32 Lesotho 0.19 0.63 
China 0.60 0.59 Liberia 0.89 0.71 
Colombia 0.67 0.07 Madagascar 0.87 0.66 
Comoros 0.06 0.01 Malawi 0.84 0.75 
Congo 0.72 0.62 Malaysia 0.70 0.68 
Costa Rica 0.24 0.18 Mali 0.86 0.33 
Djibouti 0.73 0.17 Mauritania 0.63 0.01 
Dominica 0.20 0.18 Mauritius 0.48 0.66 
Dominican 
Rep. 
0.46 0.07 Mexico 0.59 0.1 
Ecuador 0.66 0.07 Morocco 0.47 0.01 
Egypt 0.25 0.31 Mozambique 0.84 0.65 
El Salvador 0.15 0.07 Myanmar 0.47 0.24 
Ethiopia 0.76 0.61 Nepal 0.68 0.19 
Fiji 0.56 0.65 Nicaragua 0.50 0.1 
Gabon 0.83 0.52 Niger 0.72 0.21 
Gambia 0.73 0.27 Nigeria 0.89 0.7 
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Country Ethnoling. Religious 
 Frac. Frac. 
Oman 0.24 0.02 
Pakistan 0.61 0.06 
Panama 0.60 0.27 
Papua N.G. 0.35 0.48 
Paraguay 0.17 0.08 
Peru 0.66 0.09 
Philippines 0.84 0.29 
Qatar 0.64 0.14 
Rwanda 0.22 0.62 
Saudi Arabia 0.06 0.02 
Senegal 0.81 0.17 
Seychelles 0.08 0.2 
Siera Leone 0.79 0.58 
Singapore 0.42 0.66 
Solomon Is. 0.14 N/A 
Somalia 0.39 0 
South Africa 0.88 0.7 
Sri Lanka 0.71 0.52 
Sudan 0.71 0.44 
Suriname 0.73 0.71 
Swaziland 0.18 0.72 
Syria 0.21 0.19 
Tanzania 0.95 0.74 
Thailand 0.63 0.15 




Tunisia 0.09 0.01 
Turkey 0.19 0.02 
UAE 0.34 0.1 
Uganda 0.93 0.65 
Uruguay 0.26 0.54 
Vanuatu 0.16 0.48 
Venezuala 0.54 0.1 
W. Samoa 0.20 0.37 
Yemen 0.14 0.01 
Zaire 0.80 0.65 
Zambia 0.91 0.72 
Zimbabwe 0.53 0.72 
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